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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether short-termism among Norwegian public firms distorts their 
investment decisions. We follow the study by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), using 
private firms as a counterfactual for how public firms would invest absent such short-term 
pressures. By relying on exact and propensity score matching, we do so by identifying public 
and private firms similar on dimensions thought to affect corporate investment. We find that 
public firms invest significantly less than their private counterparts. In addition, public firms 
invest in a way that tend to be less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. These 
findings are not due to how we measure investment, nor to sampling or matching choices. Our 
findings suggest that short-term pressures distort the investment behavior of public firms, thus 
consistent with the study by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) of U.S. firms. Our 
thesis can thus be seen as one of the first linking short-termism to Norwegian corporate 
investment, and highlight a potential trade-off related to the going-public decision in Norway. 
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Introduction 
A major concern of public firms is that they tend to be too short-term oriented. Going back as 
far as Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989, 2003), several studies emphasizes the concern that 
public managers tend to make decisions that yield short-term gains at the expense of long-term 
interest of shareholders. More recently, Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) find that 
agency costs induce short-term pressures among U.S. public firms, causing them to invest less, 
and in a way that is less responsive to changes in investment opportunities.    
 
This thesis examines whether short-termism among Norwegian public firms distorts their 
investment decisions. Our study follows Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) in using 
private firms as a counterfactual for how public firms would invest absent such short-term 
pressures. We do so by identifying public and private firms similar on dimensions that 
theoretically should affect corporate investment. This is interesting for two reasons. First, we 
see no studies contrasting the investment behavior of Norwegian public and private firms. 
Secondly, while private firms constitute the majority of the Norwegian economy, existing 
research is limited. Studies of private firms are thus in and of itself interesting.  
 
We build our study on the underlying assumption that private firms are prone to less agency 
problems, and that any differences in investment behavior are due to public firm agency costs. 
A substantial body of literature supports this assumption1. By identifying public and private 
firms equal on characteristics thought to affect investment, our study reveals two patterns. First, 
we find that public firms invest significantly less than their private counterparts. Secondly, we 
show that public firms invest in a way that tend to be less sensitive to changes in investment 
opportunities. We show that our findings are not due to sampling or matching choices, or to 
how investments are measured, as private firms out-invest public in all of our investment 
measures. Nor are they due to private firm overinvesting, as we find no evidence of such. Our 
findings are, however, in line with the agency cost theory of short-termism. Consistent with the 
study of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), our findings suggests that short-term 
pressures among public firms distort their investment behavior. However, we distinguish our 
thesis by presenting results robust to additional alternate matching characteristics, and by 
relating short-termism to a tendency of high managerial turnover among Norwegian public 
managers.  
                                                        
1 See for example Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014). 
6 
  
Though our findings are consistent with the predictions of short-termism, there are other notions 
of the agency cost theory that potentially could explain the investment behavior of public firms. 
Instead of running efficient and profitable firms, managers may have preferences for running 
larger corporations. This theory of so-called empire building is supported by Baumol (1959), 
Jensen (1986, 1993) and Stein (2003). According to Jensen (1986, 1993), a preference for 
empire building may cause public managers to invest all funds available. Stein (2003) further 
argues that empire building gives managers incentive to increase firm size irrespective of the 
expected profitability of the investment. Another theory of the agency conflict suggesting 
overinvestment by public firms is that of managers being overconfident. Gervais, Heaton and 
Odean (2003) find that overconfident managers hesitate less before making decisions. They 
further argue that compensating such managers’ as if they were rational encourage excessive 
risk taking not in line with shareholder interest.  
 
However, we also see several notions of the agency cost theory suggesting public firm 
underinvestment. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) present a theory suggesting that managers 
who prefer the quiet life resist taking tough decision. They further argue that such a resistance 
to change often lead to bad investment decisions, such as a continuation of negative net present 
value projects. Baker (2000) finds similar evidence. According to Stein (2003), the quiet life 
theory could lead to underinvestment if the decision concerns entering a new business line. This 
is consistent with the findings of Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), which relates the theory of 
quiet life and underinvestment to managerial laziness. 
 
The tendency of managers herding their investment decisions relates to the managers career 
concerns. That is, instead of relying on their own private information about investment payoffs, 
they copy the decisions of others (Stein, 2003). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that “herding 
managers” have incentive to copy the choices of others, regardless of the historical or expected 
payoffs. According to Stein (2003), one way to generate empirical predictions of reputation-
based herding models is to look at differences in managers incentives to boost their reputation. 
Based on their lack of both experience and record of accomplishment, he then suggest that 
younger managers, as well as younger firms, have more to gain from herding than older2.  
 
                                                        
2 This prediction is also supported by Chevalier and Ellison (1998), Baker (2000), and Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000). 
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Short-termism has been defined as “seeking short-term gains to the exclusion of long-term 
achievement” (Mullins, 1991).  That is, firms cut expenditure on items such as R&D, PP&E, 
training and other factors that might improve long-term performance, in order to maximize 
current profitability (Edmans, Fang, & Lewellen, 2014). There are two broad strands within the 
literature of short-termism (Palley, 1997). One strand focuses on imperfections in financial 
markets, the other on concerns related to managerial careers. Regarding the imperfections in 
financial markets, Stein (1989) appeals to a greater information asymmetry for long-term, than 
for short-term investments. He states that because shareholders cannot observe everything 
managers do, shareholders must rely on some imperfect summary such as reported earnings. 
He thus argues that short-term behavior may represent a rational response by managers who are 
initially long-term oriented, but believe that the market attaches to much weight to the current 
share price. In a more systematic spirit, Laverty (2004) suggests that elements such as 
organizational culture, processes and routines are important in understanding why firms may 
undervalue the long-term and pay too much attention to the short-term. He finds that firms are 
less likely to engage in short-term behavior, when managers are able to create a climate of trust 
that allows them to take the short-term setbacks necessary to achieve long-term results. In 
regards to the literature related to managerial careers, Palley (1997) presents a theory of short-
termism that rests on the presence of managerial turnover, and can be thought of as an extension 
of the managerial career literature. He shows that if the managers’ future career are closely tied 
to current profitability, and the probability of managerial turnover is present, firms may engage 
in projects with higher short-term returns, but with lower net present values. The key lesson 
from this study is that it links short-termism to wider economic features; firms in economies 
with higher presence of managerial turnover are more likely to be characterized by short-term 
behavior (Palley, 1997). 
 
In the process of developing a hypothesis, we note that the theory of both empire building and 
overconfidence suggest that public firms should investment more, and be more responsive to 
changes in investment opportunities than their private counterparts. However, public firms are 
also prone to more short-term pressure than private firms, suggesting the opposite. First, this is 
supported by the findings of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) in their study of U.S. 
public and private firms. Secondly, as private firms are characterized of being illiquid, 
managers have to hold their equity stakes for a much longer period of time, imposing a longer-
term horizon (Stein, 1989). This, according to Bhide (1993), encourage managers of private 
firms to maximize its long-term value. This yields the following hypothesis:  
8 
  
 
The short-termism hypothesis 
“Public firms invest less, and are less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities than 
private firms” 
 
Our thesis examines this hypothesis by following Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), 
in using private firms as a counterfactual for how public firms would invest absent agency costs. 
We do this under the assumption that private firms are less prone to agency conflicts. This 
implies that agency problems such as empire building or overconfident managers do not occur 
among private firms. We thus believe that any differences in investment behavior between 
public and private firms will reflect agency problems among public firms. 
 
Our findings rely on a matching procedure called Propensity Score Matching (“PSM”), with a 
nearest-neighbor approach. That is, for each public firm, we find the private firm with the 
closest propensity score based a pre-decided set of matching characteristics. This procedure 
allows us to identify and compare public and private firms similar on characteristics thought to 
affect investment behavior. By implementing a PSM loop, we are able to do exact industry 
matching, as we run the PSM separately for each industry. We exclude all industries that do not 
satisfy the underlying PSM assumptions, assuring that all matched public and private firms are 
empirically comparable. To capture the potential effect of macroeconomic cycles, we conduct 
a similar procedure by running year loops, allowing us to do exact year matching. All matching 
characteristics are theoretically deterministic for corporate investment.  
 
First, we examine differences in investment levels between public and private firms. We find 
that public firms invest significantly less than their private counterparts, even after we control 
for differences in investment opportunities and lifecycle stages. These findings are not due to 
how we measure investment, as private firms out-invest public in terms of both gross and net 
tangible + intangible fixed assets. Nor are our findings due to sampling choices, as we obtain 
similar results in all of our matching samples. Using alternate matching approaches such as 
exact year matching does not alter our findings either.  
 
Next, we find that public firms invest in a way that tend to be less sensitive to changes in 
investment opportunities. Neither these results are due to how we measure investment. 
Although we present one insignificant matching sample, our findings are not driven by 
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sampling or matching approach choices. By including retained earnings and age to control for 
different lifecycle stages, and by applying an alternate matching approach to control for 
macroeconomic cycles, we show that public firms are significantly less sensitive to changes in 
investment opportunities.   
 
We then examine which agency costs among public firms that could explain our findings. We 
immediately discard the possibility of public managers being empire builders or overconfident, 
as this should have resulted in public firm overinvestment. However, it is possible that our 
findings are due to a herding-like behavior among public managers, copying each other’s 
defensive investment decisions. We find no evidence of this, as we see no herding tendencies 
between the youngest and oldest public firms in our sample. Public firm managers enjoying the 
quiet life is another possible explanation of our findings, as such decision-avoiding preferences 
often lead to bad investment decisions. Nevertheless, such preferences should result in 
excessive cash piling, creating a buffer to avoid taking difficult decisions in the future. As we 
match public and private firms on their respective cash holdings, we find no evidence of public 
firm managers enjoying the quiet life.  
 
Finally, we consider the possibility that private firms could overinvest, as they do not receive 
any feedback of such from the stock market. However, by showing that private firms are more 
profitable, in addition to unaltered results by matching on ROA, we find no evidence of private 
firm overinvestment. Our findings are, however, supportive of the notion that short-term 
pressures among public firm managers cause them to invest less, and in a way that is less 
responsive to changes in investment opportunities. According to Palley (1997) and Laverty 
(2004), firms may engage in short-term behavior if their manager`s future career are tied to 
current earnings. We find that 21% of our matched public firms replace their CEO each year 
on average. The tendency of high managerial turnover among public firms in Norway supports 
our hypothesis further. Our findings are also consistent with the study by Asker, Farre-Mensa 
and Ljungqvist (2014) on U.S. public and private firms. Our thesis contributes to the financial 
literature in several ways. First, we see no similar studies contrasting the investment behavior 
of Norwegian public and private firms. Secondly, by using private firms as a counterfactual for 
how public firms would invest absent agency costs, we identify short-termism as a potential 
driver for public firm investment. Our thesis can thus be seen as one of the first linking short-
termism to Norwegian corporate investment, and highlights a potential trade-off related to the 
going-public decision in Norway. 
10 
  
1. Related Literature 
We are aware of several studies contrasting the investment behavior of public and private firms, 
and the effects of agency problems and short-termism. As presented in the introduction, Asker, 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) show that compared to private firms, public firms invest 
substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities. These findings 
are consistent with the notion that short-term pressures distort public firms’ investment 
decisions. Analyzing hand-collected public and private firm data in the U.S. chemical industry, 
Sheen (2011) finds similar results. Furthermore, Gao, Hsu and Li (2014) links short-termism to 
corporate innovation, by showing that public firms’ patent portfolios are more exploitative (i.e. 
making use of existing knowledge) and less exploratory (i.e. pursuing new knowledge) than 
private firms’ patent portfolios.  
 
While these studies focus on the extensive margin, most prior studies focus on the intensive 
margin3. By using CEO’s stock and option grants of public U.S. firms, Edmans, Fang and 
Lewellen (2014) show that short-term pressures lead to reduced spending on R&D, capital 
expenditures and advertising. Ladika and Sautner (2014) exploit the accelerated option vesting 
in response to an earlier FAS 123-R4 compliance date, and find that with more short-term 
incentives, executives engage in short-term behavior by reducing investments. Wurgler (2000) 
relate the investment behavior of public firms to differences in corporate governance, while 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) find that investment levels decrease after a firm goes 
public. Finally, Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis (2009) show that public firms reduce 
discretionary expenditures to beat analyst forecast, collecting evidence that managers engage 
in myopic behavior to beat short-term benchmarks.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Extensive research exploits variation along the public-private firm margin, while intensive focus on the public firm margin only.  
4 Accounting standard adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in December 2004. This accounting standard required 
all firms to expense stock option grants at fair value (Ladika & Sautner, 2014).  
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2. Sample and Data 
Our dataset covers accounting and company data for all Norwegian firms and consolidated 
groups for the years 1992 to 2013. The data was obtained using the Institute for Research in 
Economics (SNF) database, available for both students and faculty at the Norwegian School of 
Economics (NHH) for research based on companies’ accounts. The data files are formatted to 
Stata 14, structured as 22 yearly files with company accounts, group accounts and company- 
and industry information, totaling to 44 files. The data are on a yearly basis delivered from the 
Brønnøysund Register Centre 5  through Bisnode D&B Norway AS, and are revised and 
standardized by Aksel Mjøs6. Although accounting variables are standardized both between 
and within firm year observations, SNF cannot guarantee complete consistency. This is due to 
continuous policy changes and different implementation paces among firms. Based on changes 
in regulations, the standardization of accounting variables are divided into two parts, 1992 – 
1999 and 2000 – 2013. For consistency and relevance purposes, we only use data from the 
latter7. Note that all amounts are in NOK 1000. 
 
To construct market values for public firms, we have merged data containing yearly closing 
share prices from NHH Børsprosjektet8  into to our sample. We obtained these data using 
Amadeus 2.0, available for both students and faculty at NHH. 
2.1 Cleaning and Sample Construction 
The dataset contains 2,990,184 public and private firm year observations. We exclude 185,840 
observations with missing or negative total assets, 4,950 observations with no listing status and 
98,229 observations with no industry specification. We further exclude 205,899 financial firms, 
as the high leverage for these firms do not have the same meaning as for non-financial firms, 
where high leverage more likely indicates financial distress (Fama & French, 1992).  
 
Industry-codes are based on the NACE-system. As the standards of this system changed in 
2008, each firm has two industry variables, “bransjek_02” and “bransjek_07”. However, 
bransjek_02 is missing firms with startup after 2008, and bransjek_07 is missing firms that only 
                                                        
5 The Brønnøysund Register Centre contains all relevant Norwegian company information, documentation and history, and develop and operate 
many of the nation`s most important registers and electronic sources (Brønnøysundregistrene, 2015).  
6 Associate Professor, dr. oecon. Norwegian School of Economics 2007. The latest revision took place in 2013, in cooperation with Endre 
Berner and Marius Olving, both students at NHH at that time.  
7 By reviewing our dataset, we noticed that some of our firm observations contained missing values. Thus, we have manually added and 
corrected some of the accounting information through Proff®, a Norwegian provider of firm information. However, we cannot guarantee that 
all errors or missing values are corrected.  
8 The database containing financial market data at NHH. Registration is required.  
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existed before 2008. To ensure yearly consistency, we generate a new industry variable called 
“bransje”, which combines the information from the former industry variables. As the former 
industry variables only overlap to a certain extent, we exclude 2,946 observations that are 
inconsistent in “bransjek_02” and “bransjek_07”. We choose to drop all observations (219,460) 
within the industries health and social and culture and media for both private and public firms, 
as these industries contains zero and six public firm year observations, respectively. In addition, 
these industries are often regulated, and thus not suitable for our analysis. We further exclude 
56 duplicate observations, 77,094 observations with non-relevant ownership structures, and 
13,972 firms registered as non-active.  
 
Figure 1 in the Appendix show the distribution of public and private observations each year 
post cleaning. As expected, our dataset contains substantially more private than public firm 
observations. Figure 2 show the distribution of public and private firm observations within each 
industry. We see that most public firms are within the general industry, while most private firms 
are within the consulting and real estate industry.  
2.1.1 Adjusting for Outliers  
The importance of removing outliers in financial data has historically been heavily discussed 
(Hadi & Simonoff, 1993). Despite their definition as extreme data points, they are still valid 
observations, and adjustment for such are largely subjective (Bruni, Fair, & O'Brien, 2012). 
When we study variables such as ROA, effective interest rate and sales growth, we see that our 
sample contains some extreme observations9. Based on these findings we choose to Winsorize 
our dataset. This implies putting an upper and lower limit for the value of the observations. 
Note that the observations are not removed from the dataset, but limited to a certain percentile 
of their values. The rationale behind this process is that the observations will affect the outcome 
in the course they otherwise would have done, but not to such an extent that they undermine 
the analysis. 
 
Empirical evidence suggest that using a Winsorizing level of 95 or 99% leads to small outcome 
differences (Brandon & Wang , 2012). However, the most common approach when analyzing 
financial data is a 98% level (Leone, Minutti-Meza, & Wasley, 2014). Despite this, we choose 
to Winsorize our data at the 99% level10, which implies that all observations higher than the 
                                                        
9 We view effective interest rates of more than 50% as examples of such observations. 
10 We follow the approach of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014). 
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99.5th percentile, and below the 0.05th percentile are set to those respective levels11. Thus, 
approximately 1% of our observations will be modified to either an upper or lower limit. By 
reviewing our dataset, we see that this process effectively removes the most extreme 
observations. We base our analysis on the Winsorized dataset. Later, in the discussion of the 
reliability of our results, we conduct a robustness test where we impose a tighter Winsorizing 
level.  
2.2 Measures of Investment  
Firms can increase their assets by either investing in new assets, or acquire other firms. These 
investments are shown in capital expenditures and by M&A activity, respectively. There are 
two reasons why we cannot use these measures to compare investment levels of public and 
private firms. First, our dataset do not specify costs related to mergers and acquisitions. 
Secondly, as private firms in most cases cannot pay for the acquired firm with stock, they are 
likely to have higher capital expenditures than public firms (Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist, 
2014). To avoid these problems and the potential biased results, we model gross investment as 
the increase in tangible fixed assets, normalized by beginning-of-year total assets. Analogously, 
we model net investment, with the difference being depreciation. As depreciation often can vary 
considerably both in and between industries, we view gross investments as the preferred 
measure.  
 
For robustness, we also measure investment as the gross and net increase in both tangible and 
intangible fixed assets. See our variable definition and construction in the Appendix for a 
detailed description of these, and all other defined variables. As we are normalizing all 
investment measures with beginning-of-year total assets, we are left with no investment 
measures for the year 2000. After the variable construction, we thus exclude all observations in 
this year. 
2.3 Measures of Investment Opportunities 
We use sales growth to measure firms’ investment opportunities, both public and private. 
Defined as the percentage annual increase in revenue, sales growth is widely used to proxy for 
investment opportunities12. 
 
                                                        
11 A 99% Winsorizing level sets the bottom 0.5% of the observations to the 0.5th percentile, and the top 0.5% of the observations to the 99.5th 
percentile, and then averages the data. 
12 For example by Rozeff (1982), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Michaely and Roberts (2012), and Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014). 
14 
  
For robustness purposes, we also construct an alternate variable to measure investment 
opportunities. By following prior empirical studies, we see Tobin’s Q as a frequently applied 
measure. Defined as the ratio of the firms’ market value to its asset replacement costs, Tobin’s 
Q is used to explain a variety of corporate phenomena, such as differences in investment 
sensitivities and diversification decisions13. However, as private firms are not publicly traded, 
we cannot determine their market value. With inspiration from Asker, Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist (2014), we solve this problem by designing an industry Q, using market values from 
the share price data for public firms. We then apply this measure to all firms, both public and 
private. The industry Q is constructed as the size-weighted average Q for each industry and 
year. As the calculation of Tobin’s Q often gets indelicate, we use the “approximate Q” as a 
proxy14, denoted as the firms’ market value to its book value of total assets (Chung & Pruitt, 
1994).  
2.4 Matching  
To test our hypothesis of short-term pressures among public firms, we need to eliminate 
differences between public and private firms that are likely to affect investment. We do so by 
following prior studies such as Saunders and Steffens (2011), Michaely and Roberts (2012), 
Gao, Hsu and Li (2014), and Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), and apply a matching 
procedure called Propensity Score Matching (“PSM”). The purpose of this matching procedure 
is to identify samples of private firms that more closely resembles public firms on dimensions 
affecting investment behavior, enabling us to “compare apples with apples”. We give a brief 
overview of the theory and the general idea behind PSM in the section below. For a detailed 
description, see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), Rubin (2001), and Austin (2011).  
2.4.1 Propensity Score Matching   
The propensity score is defined as the probability of treatment assignment conditional on 
observed baseline covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983)15. The propensity score is essentially 
a balancing score. Thus, in a set of observations with equal propensity scores, the distribution 
of observed covariates is the same between treated and control groups. We use this procedure 
to form matched sets of public and private firms who share similar values of the propensity 
scores. This allows us to identify public and private firms similar on a pre-decided set of firm 
characteristics. The propensity scores is most commonly estimated using a logit or probit 
                                                        
13 See for example Jose, Nichols, & Stevens, (1986) and Malkiel, Furstenberg, & Watson, (1979). 
14 96,6% of the variability of Tobin’s Q is explained by ”approximate Q”, (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). 
15 𝐸(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑍 = 1 | 𝑋) where Z = 1 is the treated group, and X is covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
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regression. However, we use Stata’s module psmatch2, which apply probit. For syntax and 
description, see Leuven and Sianesi (2006).  
 
There are, however, some underlying assumptions in the PSM model that needs to be addressed 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). The first is the unconfoundedness assumption, which states that 
no unobserved characteristics that affect both treatment status (listing status) and outcome 
variable (investment) can be omitted from the model. As we cannot rule out the possibility of 
such characteristics, this could limit our results16. The second assumption relates to the balance 
post-matching, which is a measure of how similar treated and control observations are on the 
pre-decided matching characteristics. Rubin (2001) recommends that B (the standardized 
difference of means of the propensity scores in the treated and matched control group)17 should 
be less than 25%, and that R (the ratio of treatment group variance to control group variance)18 
should be between 0,5 and 2 for the samples to be sufficiently balanced. We discuss this 
assumption further in Section 2.4.2. The third and last assumption is that of common support. 
By imposing a common support condition in our matching procedure, we exclude all public 
firm observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum 
propensity score for private firms – thereby satisfying this assumption.  
 
We apply the nearest-neighbor module in our matching procedure. That is, for each public firm, 
we find the private firm with the closest propensity score based on our pre-decided matching 
characteristics 19 . We also match with replacement, meaning that a private firm could be 
matched with several public firms. This reduces bias, but may also reduce efficiency (Smith & 
Todd, 2005).  
2.4.2 Matching Procedure 
To be able to analyze differences in public and private firms’ investment behavior, it is 
important to neutralize dimensions likely to affect investment. In our first matching sample, we 
follow Gao, Hsu and Li (2014), and Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), matching on 
industry and size. Gala and Julio (2011) find that size is one of the most important variables, 
both economically and statistically, when explaining variation in firm investment. We see total 
                                                        
16 In addition, this assumption is not directly testable (Imbens & Woolridge, 2008) 
17 𝐵 =  
(𝑋𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑋𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝜎𝑇
, where 𝑋𝑇̅̅̅̅  and 𝑋𝐶̅̅ ̅ is the average of the treated and control group`s covariates, respectively. 𝜎𝑇 is the standard deviation of the 
treated group.  
18 𝑅 =  
𝜎𝑇
2
𝜎𝐶
2, where 𝜎𝑇
2 and 𝜎𝐶
2 is the variance of the treated and control group, respectively. 
19 Given the size of the Norwegian economy, we do not identify more than one “neighbor”.  
16 
  
assets as the preferred variable to proxy as firm size. While market cap, for instance, reflects 
the ownership of equity only, total assets reflects the firm’s total resources (Chongyu & Li, 
2014). We inflate total assets to 2013 purchasing power to control for across-year 
comparisons20. Before we match on size, public firms are substantially larger than private firms, 
as we report in the first row in Table 1. Mean (median) total assets of public firms are 1 431 
(729) million, compared to 83.9 (15.0) million for private firms. Among others, Dudley (2008) 
show that investment varies considerably from year to year for most firms, i.e. investments are 
“lumpy”. In the rest of our study, we will focus on means rather than medians, a well-known 
choice among researchers of corporate investment (Thomas, 2002). To create a sample of firms 
in the same size range, we exclude all private firms smaller than the smallest public firm within 
each industry. 
 
As firms grow larger, higher investments are required to maintain their size-relative investment 
ratios. This implies that we cannot compare public and private firms that differ substantially in 
size, as big investment opportunities usually occur more rarely. With inspiration from both 
Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) and Gao, Hsu and Li (2014), we account for this 
non-linear relationship between size and investment by requiring the following condition to 
hold21: 
 
(1)     
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
 <  3      𝑜𝑟     
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
 >   
1
3
                                  
 
We also match on industry. Both Jorgenson (1971) and Andras and Srinivasan (2003), find that 
corporate investment vary significantly across industries. Balakrishnan and Fox (2006) relates 
this to differences in industry capital intensity. By creating an industry loop in our matching 
procedure, we ensure that all matched public and private firms always are in the same industry. 
That is, we run the PSM model separately for each industry, implying an exact industry 
matching. We then match on size (and other firms characteristics) based on the estimated 
propensity scores within each industry. To satisfy the propensity score balancing assumption, 
we only keep those industries with B; standardized difference of less than 25%, and R; variation 
ratio between 0.5 and 222. We report the dropped industries for this, and the following matching 
                                                        
20 We use the inflation rates provided by Statistics Norway (SSB) 
21 Later, in the discussion of the reliability of our result, we show our results sensitivity to varying size conditions.  
22 We exclude industries not satisfying these conditions manually.  
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samples, in Table 18. For a visual and more detailed description of our matching procedure, see 
Figure 3.  
2.4.3 Firm Characteristics Post Matching 
After we match on industry and size, we see from the bottom graph in Figure 4 that the size 
distribution for public and private firms are almost identical. As shown in Table 1, mean total 
asset for public and private firms are 1,431 million and 1,439 million, respectively. However, 
matching on industry and size yields significant differences in other firm characteristics. Table 
1 show that private firms are younger, have higher ROA and ROE, more debt, more retained 
earnings and less cash. These differences are as expected, and consistent with prior literature 
comparing public and private firms23. More surprisingly, we see that public firms have higher 
cost of debt, inconsistent with the findings of Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998). Public firms 
also face better investment opportunities when measured in sales growth, but not by Tobin’s 
approximate Q. We will investigate this more in detail in our analysis.   
2.4.4 Other Matching Characteristics 
To be able to uncover potential short-term pressures among public firms, we need to identify 
pairs of public and private firms comparable on dimensions likely to affect investment (Asker, 
Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist, 2014). This implies that matching on more characteristics than 
industry and size are necessary. However, our aim is not to neutralize all observable differences 
between public and private firms. As pointed out by Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), 
matching on too many characteristics unrelated to the outcome variable, results in samples that 
are unrepresentative of their respective populations. We thus limit the matching characteristics 
to those that theoretically should affect investment behavior.  
 
We follow Michaely and Roberts (2012), Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) and Gao, 
Hsu and Li (2014) in terms of additional matching characteristics. According to Mueller (1972), 
life cycle differences are closely related to both organizational growth and development. To 
control for lifecycle differences, we include RE/TA and firm age among our matching 
characteristics (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006). In their study of how real estate shocks 
affects corporate investment, Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) argue that both profitability 
and debt-asset ratio are important determinants of a firm’s investment level. We thus match on 
both ROA and leverage. To control for within industry differences, we also include asset ratio 
                                                        
23 See for example Brav (2009), Gao, Hsu and Li (2014) and Asker. Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014).  
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as a measure of a firm’s capital intensity (Balakrishnan & Fox, 2006). We also include cost of 
debt to control for investment costs. Finally, we also match on cash holdings, as Denis and 
Sibilkov (2009) show that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels of investment, 
especially for financial constrained firms. For a detailed description of these, an all other 
defined variables, see the variable definition and construction in the Appendix.  
 
If two or several characteristics are highly correlated, this could bias our results as we estimate 
the propensity scores using a probit model (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). We address this 
potential multicollinearity problem by creating a correlation matrix, shown in Figure 5 Panel 
A. As expected, we see a high correlation between ROA and RE/TA. However, as we show in 
Panel B, our VIF test rejects the possibility of multicollinearity biasing our results24.  
3 Empirical Analysis  
We have designed our empirical analysis to test the hypothesis regarding both investment 
levels, and sensitivity to changes in investment opportunities of public and private firms. We 
will also try to assess causes for the differences we find, in addition to test the robustness of our 
results. Later, in Section 4, we will discuss which agency costs that potentially could explain 
our findings25.  
3.1 Differences in Investment Levels  
Table 2 presents our first findings. As shown in row 1, our full pre-matched sample indicate 
that private firms on average invest 2,3% more each year than public firms. However, the 
difference is not significant. After we match on industry and size, we see from row 2 that private 
firms each year increased their gross tangible fixed assets by 8.4% on average, compared to an 
increase of 2.6% for public firms, indicating a gap of 5.8%. We see similar results when we 
include depreciation in our investment measure. Row 4 show that private firms on average 
invest 4.3% more when we measure investment as the annual increase in net tangible fixed 
assets. These findings are not due to how investment is measured, as private firms out-invest 
public firms in all of our investment measures. In fact, the gap only widens when we include 
investment in intangibles, shown by row 3 and 5. These findings are all significant at the 1% 
level, indicated by the three asterisks.  
                                                        
24 VIF is short for variance inflation factor, and is a commonly used Stata module to test for multicollinearity. A variable whose VIF is greater 
than 10 is considered questionable (Bruin, 2006).   
25 Remember that we use private firms as a counterfactual for how public firms would invest absent agency costs, under the assumption that 
any difference in investment behavior are due to public firm agency problems. 
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A substantial body of research claim that industries and firms go through life-cycle stages 
characterized by significant differences in restructuring and investment activity (Gort & 
Klepper, 1982) (Jovanovic, 1982) (Klepper, 1996). We control for these different life cycle 
stages among public and private firms by including age among our matching characteristics 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006). Shown by row 6 and 8, we find that private firms 
continue to outinvest public firms in terms of both gross and net tangible fixed assets. In fact, 
this widens the gap to 6.7% and 5.6%, respectively. Including investment in intangible fixed 
assets yields similar results, as shown in row 7 and 9.  
 
We see firms of equal size and in the same industry and lifecycle stage as good investment 
peers. First, as many of these firms are competitors, they should have the same need for 
expansion and growth to remain competitive in terms of both keeping, and collecting customers. 
Secondly, as they are of the same age, and thus in the same lifecycle stage, they should also 
have the same need for renewal of existing property, plants and equipment. Thus, in our 
industry, size and age matched sample, we should expect to see similar investment behavior 
across paired public and private firms. Instead, we find that private firms outinvest public firms 
in all of our investment measures. Shown by row 10 and 11, we find the same results both 
before and after the financial crisis. Not only do private firms invest more, Table 1 show that 
private firms also have higher return on their investments, with higher ROA (and ROE) than 
public firms. As noted by Li (2004), systematical overinvesting should have negative 
implications for a firm’s profitability. This effectively disregard the possibility that our findings 
so far are due to private firm overinvestment. However, as mentioned in Section 2.4.4, we see 
significant differences in other firm characteristics thought to affect investment. We will 
eliminate these dissimilarities in firm characteristics shortly, but it is important to notice that 
they reflect differences between public and private firms that are a direct consequence of their 
listing status, and thus drives our findings so far: private firms invest more than their public 
counterparts when matched on industry, size and age.  
3.1.1 Sampling and Matching Characteristics Choices  
It is possible that our findings so far are due to sampling choices. For instance, our findings in 
Table 2 could be due to a systematical comparison of the most profitable private, and the least 
profitable public firms. As mentioned earlier, our methodology relies in using private firms as 
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a counterfactual for how public firms would invest absent the potential agency costs. Ideally, 
we should match on as many characteristics thought to affect investment as possible. 
 
As shown in Table 3, increasing the number of matching characteristics does not alter our 
findings, with the least reliable results being significant at the 10% level. Row 2 through 5 
present our findings when we match on industry, real size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt 
and ROA26. As shown in row 2 and 4, private firms invest 3.9% and 2.9% more each year on 
average, in terms of gross and net tangible fixed assets, respectively. These results are not due 
to how we measure investment, with private firms investing significantly more when we include 
investment in intangibles, shown in row 3 and 5. In the next sample, we change cost of debt 
with asset ratio, to control for capital intensity differences within industries. We also include 
retained earnings to control for different lifecycle stages. As shown in row 6 through 9, this 
does not close the cap either. Row 10 through 13 show the results of our most detailed matching 
sample. Matching on industry, real size, leverage, cash holdings, asset ratio, ROA, retained 
earnings and cost of debt has virtually no effect on our results. If anything, the significance has 
increased. Private firms increased gross tangible fixed assets by 4.9% of total assets on average, 
compared to 1.4% for public firms. Neither these results are due to how we measure investment. 
Changing the investment measure to net increase in tangible fixed assets leads to almost the 
exact same result. The same is true when we include investment in intangibles.  We thus extend 
the findings of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) in showing that our findings are 
robust to additional alternate matching characteristics.  
 
In our next matching approach, we follow Michaely and Roberts (2012), matching on industry, 
size, leverage, cash holdings, sales growth and ROA. This alters our results. As shown in row 
2 and 4 in Table 4, private firms outinvest public in terms of both gross and net investment. 
However, we cannot reject the null that the gross or net increase in tangible fixed assets are 
equal. We find similar results in terms of investment in both gross and net tangible + intangible 
fixed assets, shown in row 3 and 5 respectively. These results are conflicting with our findings 
so far. However, as mentioned in Section 2.3, sales growth is a well-known measure for 
investment opportunities. Does this indicate that our findings presented in Table 2 and Table 3 
are due to better investment opportunities among private firms? As we show in the next section, 
this is not the case.  
                                                        
26 For detailed description of these and all other variables, see our variable definition and construction in the Appendix. 
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3.1.2 Unconditional Investment Levels 
It is possible that private firms invest more than their public counterparts because they 
experience better investment opportunities. We have two measures of investment opportunities. 
As we use market cap of public firms to create an “approximate industry Q” for private firms, 
we see sales growth as the superior measure. To control for potential differences in investment 
opportunities we follow Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) by estimating the following 
regression, holding sales growth and profitability constant27; 
 
 
(2)   𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠_𝑎𝑘𝑠) +  𝛽2(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴) +
                                      𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝜀  
 
where investment is one of the different investment measures we present in Section 2.2, 
bors_aks is our dummy indicating public or private listing status and ROA is return on assets28. 
𝛽1  show the difference in public and private firms investment levels, after we control for 
investment opportunities by holding sales growth and profitability constant. As we have 
repeated observations on both public and private firms, we expect observations to be 
independent across firms, but not necessarily within firms. Therefore, we cluster standard errors 
at the firm level, ensuring heteroscedasticity-robust standards errors. In addition, by including 
industry and year dummies, we control for industry fixed effects and year trends, respectively.  
 
The results from estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 5. Holding investment 
opportunities and profitability constant do not alter our findings, and disproves the conflicting 
results we saw in Table 4. In fact, we find that private firms invest significantly more than 
public in our full sample, shown by column 1. Column 2 through 5 show our findings in the 
size and industry matched sample. We find that private firms increased their gross and net 
tangible fixed assets by 5.8% and 3.8% more than their public counterparts. Including 
investment in intangibles has almost no effect on our results. Adding age to control for lifecycle 
differences does not alter our findings either, as shown by Table 6. Private firms continue to 
outinvest public firms, even after we control for differences in investment opportunities. The 
same is true after the financial crisis, reported in column 7.  
 
                                                        
27 We estimate the regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), assuming that E(ui | x) = 0, cov(ui , uj | x) = 0, var(ui | x) = σ
2 and no perfect 
multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 2010).  
28 Among others, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) show that investment opportunities is not a sufficient statistic for determining 
investment. ROA, however, are positively correlated with investment (Chaney, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2010). We follow these findings, and the 
findings of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), and include ROA in our regression.  
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To assess whether these findings are due to sampling choices, we estimate equation (2) using a 
more detailed matching sample. The results from this estimation are shown in Table 7. Our 
industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt and ROA matched sample leads to almost 
the exact same results. If anything, the gap has increased, as shown in Panel B. Column 1 and 
3 in Panel A show that private firms increased their gross and net tangible fixed asset by 5.7% 
and 3.8% more than public firms. Including investment in intangible fixed assets do not alter 
our findings either, as reported in column 2 and 4. For further robustness, we include retained 
earnings and asset ratio to control for lifecycle differences and capital intensity, respectively. 
Our findings from this estimation are presented in column 5 through 8. As shown in Panel B, 
including RE/TA and assets ratio virtually change nothing.    
 
Table 2 through Table 7 gives some valuable insight. Private firms invest more than their public 
counterparts on average, even after we control for differences in investment opportunities. Our 
findings are not due to how we measure investment, nor due to matching samples. Private firms 
outinvest public firms in terms of both tangible and intangible fixed assets, in all of our samples.  
3.1.3 Matching Approaches  
Our matching samples and findings so far builds on an industry loop, assuring that all matched 
public and private firms are in the same industry. This is important as capital intensity vary 
substantially across industries (Balakrishnan & Fox, 2006). To assess the robustness of our 
results, we also conduct two alternate matching approaches.  
3.1.3.1 Year Loop 
This approach is similar to the existing in terms of looping, except that we loop each year 
instead of each industry. That is, starting in 2001, we run the loop for all years up to 2013, 
ensuring that all matched observations are in the same year. We use PSM within each year to 
match on other firm characteristics. For a detailed description of this matching approach, see 
Figure 3. In this way, we capture macroeconomic cycles that potentially could affect our 
results29. Our dataset do not let us run industry and year loop simultaneously, as Stata fails to 
provide any results at all30. To still control for industry differences, we include asset ratio to 
measure a firm`s capital intensity. Through yearly looping, and by including asset ratio among 
the matching characteristics, we ensure that all firms are in the same year, while simultaneously 
controlling for industry differences. This solves our problem in Stata.  
                                                        
29 Such as government regulations, tax policies, future market expectations and private consumption. 
30 Stata fails to provide any results at all, as our sample do not contain enough observations in each industry and year. 
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The findings from this matching approach are presented in Table 8, with our least significant 
results being at the 10% level. Row 2 through 5 show the results of matching on year, capital 
intensity and size. Our findings remain unaltered. Including age to control for lifecycle 
differences does not close the gap either, reported in row 6 through 9. Private firms invest 5.1% 
and 3.4% more on average in gross and net tangible assets.  
3.1.3.2 No Loop 
In the last alternate matching approach, we step away from looping. That is, we run PSM on 
the whole dataset, without any exact variable matching31. The drawback with no looping is that 
we cannot assure that all matched public and private firm observations are in the same industry 
or year. Thus, we solely base the quality of the paired public and private firms on the achieved 
balance of the firm characteristics post matching. The results are presented in Table 9. Matching 
on year, capital intensity, size and age confirms our previous findings. As shown by row 2 and 
4, private firms invest 4.2% and 1.8% more than public firms in gross and net tangible fixed 
assets, respectively. Including investment in intangibles yields similar results, shown in row 3 
and 5. Next we follow Michaely and Roberts (2012), matching on year, asset ratio, size, ROA, 
leverage, cash holdings and sales growth. As shown in row 6 through 9, this supports our 
previous findings further. Private firms invest more in both tangible and intangible fixed assets.  
3.1.4 Investment Levels Summary 
So far, we have shown that private firms invest significantly more than their public 
counterparts. These findings are not due to how we measure investment. We show that private 
firms invest more in both tangible, and tangible + intangible fixed assets, even after we control 
for differences in investment opportunities and lifecycle stages. Nor are our findings due to 
sampling choices, as our results remain robust to several matching samples. Supporting our 
findings further, we see similar results when applying alternate matching approaches. 
 
Our findings are contradictory of what one would expect, as we see several reasons why public 
firms should invest more than private. Brav (2009) and Gao, Harford and Li (2013) show that 
public firms experience less financing frictions (i.e the time, effort and cost of collecting 
information and make a transaction) than private firms. In addition, Brav (2009) finds that 
private firms mostly rely on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid 
                                                        
31 With the two looping approaches, we do an exact matching procedure on industry and year, respectively. 
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external capital markets. He further argues that these different funding characteristics are due 
to private equity being more expensive than public equity. Furthermore, Faccio, Marchica and 
Mura (2011) document that firms controlled by large diversified shareholder (i.e. public firms) 
undertake riskier investments than firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders (i.e. 
private firms). The impact of large shareholder diversification thus affects a firms’ willingness 
to corporate risk-taking. Finally, unlike private firms, public firms have the opportunity to pay 
for acquisitions with overvalued stock (Schelifer & Vishny, 2003). 
 
Our findings so far thus support the hypothesis of short-term pressures among public firms. 
However, they also support other similar hypotheses regarding public vs private investment 
(Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist, 2014). For instance, public firm managers may prefer the 
quiet life, causing them to invest significantly less than their private peers. We will discuss 
these implications further in Section 4.    
3.2 Differences in Investment Sensitivities  
In this section, we examine how potential public firm agency costs affect their responsiveness 
to investment opportunities; if short-term pressures cause public firms to invest less, it should 
also cause public firms to be less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities, thereby 
testing our hypothesis. We do so by following Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), in 
relying on the Q theory of investment. The Q theory defines optimal investment as the point 
where the marginal benefit of investing one additional unit is equal to the marginal cost of doing 
so (Hayashi, 1982). This implies that firms should increase their investments as their investment 
opportunities improve (Yoshikawa, 1980). We examine sensitivity to changes in investment 
opportunities by estimating the following regression;  
 
(3)  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽2{𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑠_𝑎𝑘𝑠𝑖 𝑥 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)} 
                                                 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴) + 𝛽4{𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑠_𝑎𝑘𝑠𝑖 𝑥 (𝑅𝑂𝐴)} + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀               
 
 
where 𝛽1 show the sensitivity to changes in investment opportunities of private firms, 𝛽2 show 
the difference in investment sensitivity between private and public firms, while 𝛽1 plus 𝛽2 
show public firms sensitivity to changes in investment opportunities. According to the Q theory, 
both 𝛽1 and the sum of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 should have a positive impact on investment. We include 
year dummies to control for year trends. We also include firm fixed effects, by using the FE 
module in Stata. This allows us to exploit within firm variation. As in equation (2), we cluster 
standard errors at the firm level, thus obtaining heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.    
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3.2.1 Regression Results 
The results from estimating equation (3) are reported in Table 10. In our industry and size 
matched sample, we find that private firms investment decisions are more sensitive to changes 
in sales growth, shown in column (1). The estimated private firm coefficient is 1.7%, compared 
to the 1.7% – 0.6% = 1.1% coefficient for public firms. However, the difference is not 
significant. Estimating the regression in the years before and after the financial crisis yields no 
significance either. Thus, in our industry and size matched sample, we cannot distinguish 
between public and private firms investment sensitivities.  
 
One possible explanation to the findings above is that, in terms of sensitivity to changes in 
investment opportunities, we are comparing public and private firms that differ too much on 
dimensions affecting investment behavior. As discussed earlier, both leverage, cash holdings 
and ROA are all important matching characteristics when comparing corporate investment 
(Michaely & Roberts, 2012). Though our findings regarding investment levels proved to be 
robust to sampling choices, this may not be the case with investment sensitivity. Table 11 show 
the results of estimating equation (3) using our industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of 
debt and ROA matched sample. This is useful for two reasons. First, it allows us to compare 
public and private firms more similar on dimensions thought to affect investment behavior. 
Secondly, it allows us to compare public and private firms with very similar performance 
(Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist, 2014). We find that private firms’ investment decisions 
are significantly more sensitive to changes in sales growth, as reported in column (1). The 
estimated coefficient for private firms is 4.4%, compared to the 4.4% – 3.0% = 1.4% coefficient 
for public firms. As shown in column (2), we find the exact same result before the financial 
crisis, with estimated coefficients of 4.4% and 1.4% for public and private firms, respectively. 
By comparing public and private firms more similar in both investment behavioral dimensions 
and performance, we find that public firms are significantly less responsive to changes in 
investment opportunities than their private counterparts. 
 
However, our findings may be driven by model measurements errors. As pointed out by Asker, 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), our model to measure investment sensitivity could 
potentially be better suited for private firms, thus affecting the estimated coefficients. To control 
for this, they suggest estimating equation (3) for matched public firms only, and compare the 
coefficients with similar studies. Column 3 show that the coefficient for matched public firms 
is 1.5%. As we find no studies of investment sensitivities of  Norwegian public firms, we cannot 
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compare our findings with others. However, as we show similar findings as both Shin and Stulz 
(1998), Gao, Hsu and Li (2014), and Asker Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) did on U.S. 
public firms, we have faith in our model`s measurement of investment sensitivity. Another 
concern expressed by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), is that our matched public 
firms may be firms with low investment sensitivities, thus being unrepresentative of the total 
public firm population. However, by following their approach of estimating equation (3) on our 
total public firm sample, we find that the coefficient is 1.1%, which is marginally different from 
the one estimated in column (1). We report the results from this estimation in column (4). This 
proves that our matched sample are representative of public firms in general, thus not driving 
our results.  
3.2.2 Controlling for Observable Differences 
As shown in the previous section, we achieved no significance in our industry and size matched 
sample. However, by matching on industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt and ROA, 
we find that private firms are significantly more sensitive to changes in investment 
opportunities than public firms. These findings are not consistent with our analysis of 
investment levels, which proved to be robust to sampling choices. We will investigate our 
findings robustness to sampling choices further in the following sections. In addition, we will 
address the concern that lifecycle differences and macroeconomic cycles potentially could drive 
our results.  
3.2.2.1 Lifecycle Differences, Sampling Choices and Macroeconomic Cycles 
During our analysis of public and private firms’ investment levels, we emphasized the 
importance of lifecycle differences. A comparison of public and private firms in different 
lifecycle stages could potentially affect our results in this analysis as well. As argued by Gao, 
Hsu and Li (2014), firms in early lifecycle stages are often more adaptable to new technologies, 
which in turn makes them more sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. Consistent 
with our analysis of investment levels, we use retained earnings and age to control for lifecycle 
differences. The results of estimating equation (3) are reported in Table 12. 
 
We start by documenting that our industry and size matched sample yields no significance when 
we include retained earnings, as shown by column (1). However, by using age to proxy for a 
firm’s lifecycle stage, we find that the coefficient of 2.9% for private firms is significant at the 
5% level. This is interesting, even though the public coefficient, and the corresponding 
difference, of 2.9% – 1.7% = 1.2% is non-significant. Nevertheless, we document a large 
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significant investment sensitivity of private firms, and a low non-significant investment 
sensitivity of public firms, both adjusted for lifecycle differences. 
 
In column (3), we control the results of our industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt 
and ROA matched sample for potential lifecycle differences, by including retained earnings as 
one of the matching characteristics. To examine how sensitive our results are to sampling 
choices, we also include asset ratio, which simultaneously control for within industry 
differences in capital intensity. We find that the estimated coefficient for private firms are 5.2%, 
compared to 5.2% – 3.7% = 1.5% for public firms, both significant at the 1% level. Private 
firms are still more sensitive to changes in investment opportunities, even after we control for 
lifecycle differences and sampling choice.  
 
As equation (3) includes year dummies to control for yearly trends, we control for potential 
macroeconomic factors affecting our results. However, matched public and private firms are 
not necessarily observations in the same year. This is because the samples used to examine 
investment sensitivities so far are based on our industry loop, which match exact on industry 
only. As discussed in Section 3.1.3.1, macroeconomic factors are important determinants in 
explaining investment behavior. To show that our results are robust to public and private firms 
in different macroeconomic cycles, we also estimate equation (3) using our capital intensity 
and size matched sample, with exact yearly matching using a year loop32. As mentioned in 
previous sections, this approach ensures that all matched public and private firms are 
observations in the same year, while the capital intensity variable control for the main industry 
differences thought to affect investment behavior. We also include age to control for differences 
in lifecycle stages. In addition, as we are using an entirely different sample, we assess our results 
sensitivity to sampling choice. We show the results from this estimation in column (5). This 
approach yields even bigger differences. We find that the estimated sensitivity coefficient for 
private firms are 6.3%, compared to the 6.3% – 5.6% = 0.7% for public firms, both significant 
at the 1% level. Column (5) show that even after we control for lifecycle differences, 
macroeconomic cycles and sampling choice, public firms are still significantly less sensitive to 
changes in investment opportunities than their private counterparts.  
 
                                                        
32 See Figure 3 for a detailed description of the industry and year loop matching procedure. 
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3.2.2.2 Measure of Investments 
Next, we consider if our findings of differences in investment sensitivities are driven by 
outcome variable being investment in gross tangible fixed assets. As discussed during the 
analysis of investment levels, firms invest in both tangible and intangible fixed assets. We 
control for this by estimating equation (3) using gross investment in tangible + intangible fixed 
assets as outcome variable. Column (4) in Table 12 show that this does not affect our findings 
in the industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, asset ratio, ROA, retained earnings and cost of 
debt matched sample. In fact, the difference in investment sensitivity has increased, with the 
estimated coefficients for public and private firms being 5.4% and 1.7%, respectively. Using 
our exact year, capital intensity, size, and age matched sample does not alter our results either, 
as shown in column (6). Consistent with our analysis of investment levels, the differences 
between public and private firms sensitivity to changes is investment opportunities are not due 
to how we measure investment.  
3.3 Reliability of our Findings  
Our findings so far show that public firms invest significantly less than their private 
counterparts. In addition, public firms invest in a way that tend to be less sensitive to changes 
in investment opportunities. In this section, we discuss the reliability of our findings, by 
assessing the robustness to alternate Winsorizing levels and size conditions. 
3.3.1 Sensitivity to Winsorizing Levels 
Our analyses are based on a dataset Winsorized at the 99% level. To assess the robustness of 
our results, we increase the level from 99% to 99.8%, implying that all observation higher than 
99.9th percentile and lower than 0.1st percentile are modified to either an upper or lower limit. 
In other words, only 0.2% of the most extreme values will be adjusted.  
 
As expected, Table 14 presents higher standard deviations of the differences in means between 
public and comparable private firms. This is due to less matched public and private firms, as 
more observations violate the balancing assumption used in the PSM model33. However, Table 
15 and Table 16 show that private firms still invest significantly more than their public 
counterparts. In addition, we see from Table 17 that private firms are still more sensitivity to 
changes in investment opportunities. However, we find significant results in our sample 
                                                        
33 We list all dropped industries and years that do not satisfy the balancing assumption in Table 18 Panel B and Table 19 Panel B, respectively. 
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including lifecycle effects only, as shown in column (5). Furthermore, the sample in column 
(3) and (4) contains substantially less observations. Thus, our findings regarding differences in 
investment sensitivities only partly proves robust to a tighter Winsorizing level. 
3.3.2 Sensitivity to Size Condition  
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, we imposed a size condition in our matching procedure to control 
for the implied non-linear relationship between size and investment. A possible implication 
with our findings so far, is that we systematically could be comparing smaller private firms, 
with bigger public firms. Panel A and Panel B in Figure 6 show the robustness of our findings 
to varying size conditions. Our results so far are based on the [33%,300%] requirement. As we 
tighten the size-condition, the difference in investment levels between public and private firms 
are increasing. Except from the small drop at the [50%,200%] condition, the same is true for 
our findings of investment sensitivities. We thus show that our findings regarding both 
investment levels and investment sensitivity are robust to tighter size conditions, and discard 
the possibility of our findings being due to a systematical comparison of smaller private firms 
with bigger public firms.   
4. Investment Behavior, Agency Costs and Short-termism  
The findings in Section 3 supports our hypothesis regarding the investment behavior of public 
and private firms; public firms invest less than their private counterparts, and in a way that tend 
to be less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. In the following sections, we will 
discuss possible causes explaining these results, under the assumption that any differences in 
investment behavior between public and private firms are due to public firm agency problems. 
We immediately discard the possibility of empire building or overconfident public managers 
driving our results. If this were the case, public firms should invest more, and in a way that is 
more responsive to changes in investment opportunities. This is the opposite of our findings in 
Section 3.  
4.1 Herding among Public Managers 
Herding managers have incentive to copy the choices of others, regardless of the historical or 
expected payoffs (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Our results could thus be driven by a “herding-
like behavior” among public firm managers, copying each other’s defensive investment 
decision. As noted by Stein (2003), one way of assessing such behavior is to examine the age 
of the CEO or the firm itself. Several empirical studies show that younger CEO`s and firms 
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have more to gain from herding than older, and thus are more likely to engage in such 
behavior34. Our dataset do not include the age of the CEO, but we do have access to firm age. 
Figure 7 show the age distribution among the public firms in our industry, size, leverage, cash 
holding, cost of debt and ROA matched sample, in bins of approximately 15 years35. The 
distribution is highly skewed to the left, with the majority of observations being firms younger 
than 30 years. According to Stein (2003), if young firms actually do herd, they should copy the 
investment decisions of more mature and experienced firms. We should thus expect to find 
similar investment levels among the public firms younger than 10 years, and older than 20 
years. Figure 8 show the kernel density distribution of gross investment in tangible fixed assets 
for public firms older than 20, and younger than 10 years, respectively. We see no clear signs 
of younger firms copying the investment decisions of older firms, and thus no evidence of a 
herding-like behavior driving our results, as younger public firms invest more than older.   
4.2 Quiet Life Preferences among Public Managers  
The quiet life theory states that public firm managers may be prone to inertia when it comes to 
making difficult decisions (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). As studies show that such 
preferences could lead to underinvestment in situations regarding entering a new business line, 
or due to public managers being lazy, this could potentially drive our results36. According to 
Gao, Harford and Li (2013), managers with a preference for the quiet life have an incentive to 
pile cash as a buffer to avoid making difficult decisions. If the theory of quiet life preferences 
were driving our results, we should expect to see a systematical relationship of high cash and 
low investments levels among public firms, and low cash and high investment levels among 
private firms. However, as most of our different samples include cash holdings as a matching 
characteristic, we are comparing public and private firms with equal cash levels. Still, we find 
that public firms invest significantly less than private. We thus find no clear indications of our 
findings being due to underinvestment among public firm managers that enjoy the quiet life, as 
we neutralize the potential effect of such preferences by controlling for different cash levels. In 
addition, previous studies show that public managers enjoying the quiet life usually occur in 
monopolistic markets37. As the Norwegian market are highly monitored by The Competition 
Authority38, this supports our prediction further.  
                                                        
34 See for example Chevalier and Ellison (1998), Baker (2000) and Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000). 
35 We find similar results using other matching samples. 
36 See Stein (2003), and Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). 
37 See for example Hicks (1935), Rohades and Rutz (1982) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
38 The Competition Authority`s main task is to enforce the Competition Act, which main purpose is to stimulate competition.  
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4.3 Short-termism among Public firms 
Finally, as stated in our initial hypothesis, our results could be due to short-term pressures 
among public firm managers. According to Palley (1997) and Laverty (2004), firms may engage 
in short-term behavior if the manager’s future career is tied to current earnings. A way to test 
this implication is to examine the degree of managerial turnover among our matched public 
firms. Figure 9 show the number of replaced public firm CEO`s each year39. We find that 21% 
of public firms replace their CEO each year on average. To put it differently, each year one in 
five public firm CEO`s lose or change their job on average. We view these findings as an 
indication of rapid managerial turnover among public CEO`s, thus supporting our hypothesis 
of a short-term distortion of public firms investment behavior. In addition, our findings are 
consistent with the theories of both Stein (1988) and Mullins (1991), that asymmetrical 
information causes the market to attach too much weight to the current stock price, resulting in 
public firm managers maximizing current earnings by underinvesting. Our findings thus 
suggests that short-term pressures distorts the investment decisions of public firms, causing 
them to invest less, and in a way that is less responsive to changes in investment opportunities. 
These findings are also consistent with the study of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) 
on U.S. firms.  
 
A possible implication, however, is that if systematical underinvestment among public firms 
actually is the case, it should raise concerns among shareholders. Models of short-termism 
usually assume that public managers seek short-term gains to the exclusion of long-term 
achievement, as such behavior provides higher personal utility40. This gives incentive to boost 
current earnings by discretionally cut expenditures through underinvestment. While 
shareholders can observe the actual investment, they cannot observe the extent of their 
manager`s underinvestment, due to asymmetrical information of investment opportunities.  
However, they observe and understand the manager’s incentives, and thus account for this 
underinvestment. Yet, public managers continue to underinvest. Asker, Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist (2014) explain this with the prisoners` dilemma; in equilibrium, shareholders 
assume that the manager will underinvest, and the manager will actually do so. We find this as 
a good explanation for how short-termism can distort public firm managers’ investment 
decisions over time.  
                                                        
39 The findings are from our industry and size matched sample. However, we find similar results in all of our matching samples.  
40 See Narayanan (1985) and Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) 
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4.4 Private Firm Overinvesting 
Although our findings are supportive with the predictions of short-termist pressures among 
public firms, they could also be due to private firm overinvesting, as private firms do not receive 
any feedback of such by the stock market. According to Li (2004), systematical overinvestment 
should have negative implications for a firm’s profitability. In most of our samples, we have 
matched public and private firms with equal profitability, measured by ROA. By comparing 
firms with the same profitability, we lessen any overinvestment tendencies among private firms, 
as such firms are excluded from our samples. However, our findings in the industry, size and 
age matched samples do not control for profitability. Could the results in these samples be due 
to systematic overinvestment by private firms? Table 13 suggest that this is not the case. We 
find that private firms are significantly more profitable than public in our industry, size and age 
matched sample. We thus find no evidence of private firm overinvesting driving our results.   
4.5 Limitations, Comments and Suggestions for further Studies  
As noted by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), a key assumption behind the theory of 
short-term pressures among public firms, is that private firms actually experience zero or few 
agency problems. We have assumed this during our study. Even though a substantial body of 
literature is supportive of this assumption41, we cannot provide evidence for such a context. 
This is due to the fact that our dataset provides no or limited information of ownership structure. 
Thus, we have to rely on previous literature. The implication of potential agency problems 
among private firms is that it permits other possible explanations to our findings, such as private 
firm managers being overconfident or empire builders. This is thus one of our suggestions to 
further studies of this subject. However, we find that the mean percentage ownership interest 
of the biggest shareholder (i.e. the owner with the highest number of shares) is 0.7955 and 
0.3928 for private and public firms, respectively. Although these findings cannot rule out the 
existence of agency costs among private firms, it indicate that private firms should experience 
less agency costs than public firms. 
 
Although the discussions in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 suggest that the agency theories of 
herding and quiet life do not explain our findings, we cannot completely rule out such a 
possibility. However, we base our conclusion on several identified indications more similar 
with the notion of short-termism.  
 
                                                        
41 See for example Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014). 
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Another possible limitation with our findings is endogeneity of a firms listing status. As 
expressed by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), our findings could potential reflect 
unobserved differences between the types of firm that tend to go public or stay private, and not 
as a result of their actual listing status. Our findings could also be due to private firms 
developing slower than public firms, although we control for lifecycle stages by matching on 
age and retained earnings. Private firms would then stay longer in the preliminary stages, 
characterized by heavier capital investment needs (Balakrishnan & Fox, 2006). Given the data 
we have, we cannot further control for these possible implications, and they both create 
limitations in our findings.  
 
The next limitation relates to financial constraints. During our analysis of investment 
sensitivity, we achieved insignificant results when using Tobin`s Q as an alternate measure of 
investment opportunities. Thus, we base our conclusion on sales growth being the correct 
measure of investment opportunities. As noted by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), 
this is a potential concern as growth in revenue may enable higher increase in investment levels 
of firms that are financially constrained. If private firms are more financial constrained than 
public, this could drive our findings of investment sensitivity. Although Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist (2013) show that this is not the case of U.S. private firms, we cannot rule out this 
possibility in Norway given our data.    
 
The last limitation we want to address relates to the Norwegian economy as a whole. Compared 
the study by Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) of the U.S., the Norwegian economy 
is substantially smaller. An implication with this is that we are less likely to identify public and 
private firms identical on our matching characteristics. This is supported by Table 18 and Table 
19, where we report all the industries and years not satisfying the balancing condition. As 
presented in Section 2.4.1, the balancing condition measures the quality of the propensity score 
matching. Although we base all our findings on samples satisfying this condition, we still face 
the possibility of comparing public and private firms that, up to a certain extent, still could 
differ on our matching characteristics.  
 
Finally, our analysis include public firms listed on Oslo Børs (OSEBX) and Oslo Axess 
(OAAX). Firms listed on the OAAX are smaller firms and usually less traded than the firms 
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listed at the OSEBX 42. In addition, a listing at the OAAX requires less shareholders. According 
to the reviewed agency cost theory, such features suggest that firms listed at the OAAX should 
experience less agency problems, and thus less short-term pressures than OSEBX firms. This 
implies that by analyzing OSEBX and private firms only, we should expect to find even bigger 
investment behavior differences. However, as our dataset do not distinguish OSEBX and 
OAAX listed firms, we cannot examine this. Note that this is not a limitation of our study, but 
a suggestion to further research regarding this subject.  
5. Conclusion 
This thesis examines whether short-termism distorts the investment behavior of Norwegian 
publicly listed firms, by following the recent study of Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 
(2014). Under the assumption that private firms experience zero or few agency problems, we 
use private firms as a counterfactual for how public firms would invest absent such agency 
costs. We do so by applying an exact and propensity score matching procedure using Stata 14, 
allowing us to identify and compare public and private firms equal on characteristics 
theoretically deterministic for corporate investment.  
 
We find that public firms invest significantly less than their private counterparts. In addition, 
they invest in a way that tend to be less sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. Our 
findings are consistent with prior studies of this subject, and support the hypothesis of short-
term pressures distorting the investment decisions of public firms.    
 
Our thesis contributes to the financial literature in several ways. First, we see no similar studies 
contrasting the investment behavior of Norwegian public and private firms. Secondly, by using 
private firms as a counterfactual for how public firm would invest given the absence of agency 
costs, we identify short-termism as a potential driver for public firm investment. This is 
supported by indications of a high presence of managerial turnover. Our thesis can thus be seen 
as one of the first linking short-termism to Norwegian corporate investment, and highlight a 
potential trade-off related to the going-public decision in Norway. 
 
                                                        
42 By accessing the Facts and Figures for November 2015 (as well as any other month) at the Oslo Børs webpages, we find that the average 
daily number of trades / number of issuers, generally are much higher at OSEBX than at OAAX. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
  
Indicators  
  
   Bors_aks An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company are listed on Oslo Stock Exchange for the 
whole or part of the year, and zero otherwise. 
  
   Bransje An industry breakdown, based on the NACE-system. 
     
   Aar An indicator for each financial year. 
  
Investment Opportunities  
  
   Sales growth The annual change in revenue, normalized by beginning-of-year revenue. 
  
   Approximate Q Proxy of Tobin`s Q. Estimated as the market value to the book value of total assets. Market 
value for private firms are estimated using the average market value for public firms in 
each industry and each year. 
  
Investment Measures  
  
   Gross  Defined as the annual change in gross tangible fixed assets, normalized by beginning-of-
year total assets. Accounting for depreciation. 
  
   Gross + intangible Defined as the annual change in gross tangible + intangible fixed assets, normalized by 
beginning-of-year total assets. Accounting for depreciation. 
  
   Net Defined as the annual change in net tangible fixed assets, normalized by beginning-of-year 
total assets. Not accounting for depreciation. 
  
   Net + intangible Defined as the annual change in net tangible + intangible fixed assets, normalized by 
beginning-of-year total assets. Not accounting for depreciation. 
  
Firm Characteristics  
  
   Age Number of years since the firm was incorporated. 
  
   Size Defined as the sum of fixed and current assets. All values are reported in 1000 NOK, 
nominal value. 
  
   Real size  Defined as total assets inflated to 2013 purchasing power, using the inflation rate provided 
by Statistics Norway. All values are reported in 1000 NOK. 
  
   ROA Defined as the return on assets. Estimated by net income normalized by total assets. 
  
   Asset ratio Defined as revenue normalized by total assets, measuring capital intensity. 
  
   Leverage Defined as debt normalized by total assets. 
  
   RE / TA Defined as retained earnings normalized by total assets. 
  
   Cost of debt Defined as interest paid normalized by interest bearing debt. 
  
   Cash holdings Defined as cash normalized by total assets. 
  
   ROE Defined as the return on equity. Estimated using the DuPont identity. 
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Variable Construction 
Variable Definition [variable names from SNF database are reported in brackets] 
  
Investment Opportunities  
  
   Sales growth  Revenue t [salgsinn t] - Revenue t-1 [salgsinn t-1] 
                  Revenue t-1 [salgsinn t-1]      
  
   Approximate Q Market Cap + Net Debt            [ market_cap_proxy + kgjeld + lgjeld – cash]   
            Total Assets                                                 [sumeiend] 
  
Investment Measures  
  
   Gross  Tangible Fixed Assets t + Depreciation t – Tangible Fixed Assets  t-1  
                                      Total Assets  t-1 
 
[avskr t + eiend t + maskanl t + skiprigfl t + drlosore – eiend t-1 - maskanl t-1- skiprigfl t-1- drlosore t-1]               
                                                          [sumeiend  t-1] 
 
   Gross + intangibles Change in Gross Tangible Fixed Assets + Change in Gross Intangible Fixed Assets 
                                                    Total Assets  t-1 
 
 [sumeiend  t + avskr - sumeiend  t-1 – (oml t – oml t-1) – (finanlm t – finanlm t-1) ]                                                                                                     
                                                  [sumeiend  t-1] 
 
   Net Tangible Fixed Assets t  – Tangible Fixed Assets  t-1  
                              Total Assets  t-1 
 
 [eiend t + maskanl t + skiprigfl t + drlosore – eiend t-1 - maskanl t-1- skiprigfl t-1- drlosore t-1] 
            [sumeiend  t-1] 
 
   Net + intangibles Change in Net Tangible Fixed Assets + Change in Net Intangible Fixed Assets 
                                                 Total Assets  t-1 
                                                                         
[sumeiend  t - sumeiend  t-1 – (oml t – oml t-1) – (finanlm t – finanlm t-1) ]                                      
                                           sumeiend  t-1 
  
Firm Characteristics  
  
   Age Year [aar] – Year of incorporation [stiftaar] 
  
   Size Total Assets[sumeiend] 
  
   Real size  Total Assets [sumeiend] * (1+inflation t,2013)  
  
   ROA    Net income [aarsrs]    ,                                                
Total Assets [sumeiend] 
  
   Asset ratio         Revenue [salgsinn]          .          
     Total Assets [sumeiend] 
  
   Leverage Long Term Debt [lgjeld] + Short Term Debt [kgjeld] 
                 Total Assets [sumeiend] 
  
   RE / TA Net Income [aarsrs] – Dividends [utb + konsbid]  
                   Total Assets [sumeiend]  
  
   Cost of debt                        Interest Paid [rentekost]              . 
  Interest Bearing Debt [rkgjeld_max + rlgjeld] 
  
   Cash holdings           Cash [cash]           . 
Total Assets [sumeiend] 
  
   ROE Net Income [aarsrs]   *        Sales [salgsinn]            * Total Assets [sumeiend]                                       
   Sales [salgsinn]           Total Assets [sumeiend]               Equity [ek]    
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Figure 1. Distribution of Public and Private Firms per Year 
Panel A and Panel B presents the number of public and private firm observations each year in our full sample, respectively. 
The differences is substantial, with a total of 1 956 public firm year observations and 520 112 private firm year observations.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of Public and Private Firms per Industry 
Panel A and Panel B show the distribution of public and private firm year observations in each industry in the period between 
2001 and 2013. For further details and discussions regarding the industry variable, see Section 2.1. 
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Figure 3. Matching Procedure 
The purpose of this figure is to give a visual description of our matching procedure. Our industry (year) loop ensures that all 
matched public and private firms are in the same industry (year), as shown in stage (1). Within each industry (year), we run 
PSM on the other matching characteristics, identifying public and private firms in each industry (year) similar on those 
characteristics. This is stage (2). We then manually exclude all industries (years) not satisfying the propensity score balancing 
assumption. We report all excluded industries (years) for the different samples in Table 18 (Table 19). Stage (3) leads to our 
temporary sample. Next, in stage (4), we run our temporary sample through the size condition, ensuring that matched public 
and private firms are of approximately the same size. Stage (4) leads to our final matching samples, which is the samples used 
in all analyses.  
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Figure 4. Size Distribution of Public and Private Firms 
The top and bottom graph reports the Kernel density size distribution of public and private firms in our full and industry-size 
matched sample, respectively. Before we match on industry and size, we see that public firms are much larger than private. 
The bottom graph shows that, after we match on industry and size, the size distributions are nearly identically, implying a high 
matching quality. For further details of this, and all other matching samples, see Section 2.1 and Section 2.4. The “odd” shapes 
are due to a Winsorizing of the variables at the 99% level.   
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Figure 5. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Test 
Panel A presents a correlation matrix for the different matching characteristics included in our analysis. We find a high 
correlation between ROA and RE/TA, indicated by the highlighted cell. Panel B reports the results from the multicollinearity 
test. As all VIF values are less than 10, we do not address the potential problems with multicollinearity further.  
 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
Panel B  
Size Asset ratio Leverage Cash holdings RE/TA ROA Cost of debt
Size 1.00
Asset ratio -0.06 1.00
Leverage -0.10 0.08 1.00
Cash holdings -0.06 0.20 -0.16 1.00
RE/TA 0.01 0.04 -0.30 0.09 1.00
ROA 0.00 0.09 -0.30 0.19 0.83 1.00
Cost of debt -0.02 0.12 -0.05 0.07 0.01 0.04 1.00
Variable VIF 1/VIF  
ROA 3.43 0.292
RE/TA 3.35 0.298
Leverage 1.16 0.860
Cash holdings 1.11 0.898
Asset ration 1.08 0.929
Cost of debt 1.02 0.979
Size 1.02 0.983
* Multicollinearity if VIF > 10
Mean VIF 1.74
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Figure 6.  Sensitivity to Size Condition 
This figure show the sensitivity of our findings to different size conditions. For a description and discussion of the size 
condition, see Section 2.4.2.  In both panels, we use our industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt and ROA matched 
sample. Panel A reports the differences between public and private firms investment levels. We find that private firms invest 
more regardless of size condition choice. Panel B reports the differences in sensitivity to changes in investment opportunities 
between public and private firms. We find that private firms are more responsive to investment opportunities for all size 
conditions. We use sales growth to proxy for investment opportunities. Our findings in both panels are significant at the 5 % 
level. Note that in these graphs, we have changed our reporting of difference in investment from public – private, to private – 
public.  
 
Panel A: Investment Level Differences 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Investment Sensitivity Differences   
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Figure 7.  Age Distribution of Matched Public Firms 
This figure show the age distribution of public firms in our industry, size, leverage, cash, cost of debt and ROA matched sample. 
Each bin is set to approximately 15 years. The distribution is highly skewed, with most of the public firms being younger than 
30 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Gross Investment Levels 
This figure show the gross investment level distribution of public firms in our industry, size, leverage, cash, cost of debt and 
ROA matched sample, for firms older than 20, and younger than 10 years, respectively.  
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Figure 9. Number of Replaced CEOs 
This figure show the number of replaced public CEOs each year in our industry and size matched sample. We find similar 
results using other samples. Approximately 21% of the public matched firms replace their CEO each year on average.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table show summary statistics of Norwegian public and private firms for the period 2001 to 2013. Our full sample consist 
of 87 443 private firms and 311 public firms, with 520 112 and 1 956 firm-year observations, respectively. The matched sample 
is obtained by using exact industry loop matching and propensity score size matching. See further description under Section 
2.4. The industry-size matched sample consist of 1 955 public firm-year observations (311 public firms) and 1 955 comparable 
private firm-year observations (1 229 private firms). For a detailed description of these, and all other variables, see our variable 
definition and construction in the Appendix. All values are reported in NOK 1000 of 2013 purchasing power. All variables are 
Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile (except approximate Q and age), to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our 
results. Test statistics of mean (median) differences in firm size, investment opportunities and firm characteristics are obtained 
by using t-tests (Wilcoxon-tests). The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript 
***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations.  
 
Public 
Firms
Private
 Firms Diff.
Public 
Firms
Private
 Firms Diff.
Firm Size
Total assets mean 1 430 582 83 883   1 346 699 *** 1 431 283 1 439 558 -8 275 ***
median 728 951    14 951   714 000    ***
st. dev. 1 425 295 332 799 1 425 323 1 424 982 
Investment Opps.
Sales growth mean 0.880 0.336 0.544 *** 0.883 0.302 0.581 ***
median 0.020 0.028 -0.008
st. dev. 4.663 2.669 4.715 2.168
Approximate Q mean 25.426 30.957 -5.532 *** 25.427 26.799 -1.372 **
median 18.838 26.928 -8.089 ***
st. dev. 23.795 21.209 23.801 26.876
Firm Characteristics
ROA mean -0.047 0.050 -0.097 *** -0.047 0.052 -0.099 ***
median 0.010 0.034 -0.024
st. dev. 0.255 0.161 0.255 0.136
Asset ratio mean 0.241 0.905 -0.664 *** 0.241 0.585 -0.345 ***
median 0.011 0.089 -0.078 ***
st. dev. 0.465 1.412 0.465 0.981
Leverage mean 0.444 0.666 -0.222 *** 0.444 0.591 -0.147 ***
median 0.431 0.730 -0.299 ***
st. dev. 0.280 0.321 0.280 0.304
RE/TA mean -0.069 0.012 -0.080 *** -0.069 0.037 -0.106 ***
median -0.003 0.011 -0.014 ***
st. dev. 0.249 0.156 0.249 0.142
Cost of debt mean 0.076 0.062 0.014 *** 0.075 0.042 0.033 ***
median 0.038 0.041 -0.002
st. dev. 0.210 0.158 0.206 0.167
Cash holdings mean 0.130 0.149 -0.019 *** 0.130 0.074 0.056 ***
median 0.056 0.054 0.002 *
st. dev. 0.188 0.207 0.188 0.143
Age mean 28.038 15.092 12.945 *** 28.047 18.611 9.436 ***
median 15.000 11.000 4.000 ***
st. dev. 32.571 15.538 32.577 19.255
ROE mean -0.096 0.334 -0.431 *** -0.091 0.283 -0.374 ***
median 0.027 0.188 -0.162 ***
st. dev. 1.243 1.357 1.152 1.133
No. of observations* 1 956        520 112 1 955        1 955        
No. of firms 311           87 443   311           1 229        
Full Sample Matched Sample
* Sales growth, cost of debt and ROE contains less observations due to missing values.
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Table 2. Conditional Investment Levels – Industry Loop 
This table reports the investment levels of matched public and private firms, based on our exact industry loop matching and propensity score matching. We describe the matching procedure in 
Section 2.4.We only keep industries that satisfies the propensity score balancing assumptions, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. For a further 
description of this assumption, see Section 2.4.1. We list all dropped industries in Table 18, Panel A. In row 2 to 5, we match on industry and size, while row 6 to 9 include firm age to control for 
lifecycle differences. Row 10 and 11 show the difference in investment level before and after the global financial crisis, respectively. Size is set to 2013 purchasing power, to control for across 
year comparisons. A detailed description of all variables are reported in the variable definition and construction in the Appendix. Both firm characteristics (except age) and investment measures 
are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. We use paired t-tests to assess differences in investment levels between matched public and 
private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
 
Sample Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms
1 Full sample: Gross 0.041 0.474 1 956         311 0.064 3.113 520 112     87 443       -0.023
Sample matched on:
2 Gross 0.026 0.171 1 955         311 0.084 0.258 1 955         1 229         -0.057 ***
3 Gross + intangibles 0.039 0.235 1 955         311 0.102 0.287 1 955         1 229         -0.063 ***
4 Net 0.005 0.156 1 955         311 0.047 0.242 1 955         1 229         -0.043 ***
5 Net + intangibles 0.018 0.224 1 955         311 0.066 0.278 1 955         1 229         -0.048 ***
Sample matched on: Industry, size, ln age
6 Gross 0.026 0.193 1 102         212 0.093 0.288 1 102         609            -0.067 ***
7 Gross + intangibles 0.039 0.246 1 102         212 0.105 0.315 1 102         609            -0.066 ***
8 Net 0.009 0.183 1 102         212 0.065 0.277 1 102         609            -0.056 ***
9 Net + intangibles 0.022 0.235 1 102         212 0.077 0.508 1 102         609            -0.055 ***
 
Sample matched on:
10 Gross 0.033 0.194 380            104 0.084 0.259 380            252 -0.050 ***
Sample matched on:
11 Gross 0.010 0.139 568            153 0.088 0.297 568            377 -0.078 ***
Industry, size, ln age (time span: 2001-2007)
Industry, size, ln age (time span: 2008-2013)
R
o
w
Public Firms Private Firms Public - Private FirmsDifference in
 Means
Industry, size
Investment
Measure
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Table 3. Conditional Investment Levels: Detailed Matching – Industry Loop 
This table reports investment levels of matched public and private firms. Compared to Table 2, we include several other firm characteristics in the matching procedure. We describe the matching 
procedure in Section 2.4.We only keep industries that satisfies the propensity score balancing assumptions, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. For 
a further description of this assumption, see Section 2.4.1. We list all dropped industries in Table 18, Panel A. In row 2 to 5, we match on industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt and 
ROA, while row 6 to 9 include asset ratio and RE/TA to control for within industry differences in capital intensity and  lifecycle differences, respectively. Finally, row 10 to 13 combines all 
matching characteristics used in the previous rows. Size is set to 2013 purchasing power, to control for across year comparisons. A detailed description of all variables are reported in the variable 
definition and construction in the Appendix. Both firm characteristics and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our 
results. We use paired t-tests to assess differences in investment levels between matched public and private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given 
superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
 
Sample
Investment
Measure Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms
1 Full sample: Gross 0.041 0.474 1 956         311            0.064 3.113 520 112     87 443       -0.023
Sample matched on:
2 Gross 0.012 0.169 829 211 0.052 0.211 829 506 -0.039 ***
3 Gross + intangibles 0.020 0.208 829 211 0.057 0.234 829 506 -0.037 ***
4 Net -0.001 0.160 829 211 0.028 0.196 829 506 -0.029 ***
5 Net + intangibles 0.007 0.197 829 211 0.033 0.217 829 506 -0.026 **
Sample matched on:
6 Gross 0.026 0.175 675 191 0.054 0.216 675 430 -0.027 ***
7 Gross + intangibles 0.037 0.239 675 191 0.063 0.251 675 430 -0.025 *
8 Net 0.008 0.163 675 191 0.034 0.207 675 430 -0.026 ***
9 Net + intangibles 0.020 0.230 675 191 0.043 0.240 675 430 -0.023 *
Sample matched on:
10 Gross 0.014 0.133 596 144 0.049 0.222 596 331 -0.035 ***
11 Gross + intangibles 0.021 0.164 596 144 0.053 0.232 596 331 -0.031 ***
12 Net 0.002 0.125 596 144 0.032 0.213 596 331 -0.030 ***
13 Net + intangibles 0.010 0.156 596 144 0.036 0.221 596 331 -0.026 **
Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt, ROA
Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, asset ratio, ROA, RE/TA
Industry, size, leverage,  cash holdings, asset ratio, ROA, RE/TA, cost of debt
R
o
w
Public Firms Private Firms Public - Private Firms
Difference in
 Means
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Table 4. Conditional Investment Levels: Michaely and Roberts (2012) – Industry Loop 
This table reports the investment levels of matched public and private firms, based on the matching characteristics suggested by Michaely and Roberts (2012). We describe the matching procedure 
in Section 2.4. We only keep industries that satisfies the propensity score balancing assumptions, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. We list all 
dropped industries in Table 18, Panel A. Due to several missing sales growth observations, this sample consists of 876 firm-year observations. Row 2 to 5 show the results when we match on 
industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, sales growth and ROA. Size is set to 2013 purchasing power, to control for across year comparisons. A detailed description of all variables are reported in 
the variable definition and construction in the Appendix. Both firm characteristics and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers 
on our results. We use paired t-tests to assess differences in investment levels between matched public and private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms
1 Full sample: Gross 0.041 0.474 1 956         311 0.064 3.113 520 112     87 443       -0.023
Sample matched on:
2 Gross 0.030 0.194 438            142 0.049 0.178 438            262 -0.019
3 Gross + intangibles 0.032 0.234 438            142 0.051 0.200 438            262 -0.020
4 Net 0.005 0.178 438            142 0.016 0.164 438            262 -0.011
5 Net + intangibles 0.007 0.225 438            142 0.018 0.185 438            262 -0.011
Industry, size, leverage,  cash holdings, sales growth and ROA
R
o
w
Investment
Measure
Public Firms Private Firms Public - Private FirmsDifference in
 Means
55 
 
Table 5. Unconditional Investment Levels 
This table reports the results from estimating equation (2) in Section 3.1.2. The sample is identical with the one we present in 
Table 2, matching on industry and size. The public coefficient show the difference between public and private firms investment 
levels, holding investment opportunities (sales growth) and profitability (return on assets) constant. We control for year trends 
and industry fixed effects by implementing dummies in our ordinary least square (OLS) regression. These are not reported. We 
list heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors underneath the related coefficient. Standard-errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Both firm characteristics and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of 
spurious outliers on our results. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript 
***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
 
 
 
Sample:
Gross + Net +
Dependent Variable:   Gross   Gross Intangible Net Intangible
(1) (3) (4) (5)
Public -0.029 *** -0.058 *** -0.053 *** -0.038 *** -0.034 **
0.005 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010
Inv. Opps. 0.004 *** 0.011 *** 0.016 *** 0.010 *** 0.015
0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
ROA -0.043 *** -0.034 -0.015 0.008 0.027
0.002 0.023 0.027 0.020 0.026
R
2
1.2% 7.6% 8.5% 5.8% 7.6%
R
2 
adj. 1.2% 6.6% 7.5% 4.7% 6.5%
No. Obs 314 284 2 280 2 280 2 280 2 280 
No firms 62 750   1 044 1 044 1 044 1 044 
Full
(2)
 Industry, Size
56 
 
Table 6. Unconditional Investment Levels – Controlling for Lifecycle Differences 
This table reports the results from estimating equation (2) in Section 3.1.2. The sample is identical with the one we present in 
Table 2, matching on industry, size and age. Age is included to control for lifecycle differences. The public coefficient show 
the difference between public and private firms investment levels, holding investment opportunities (sales growth) and 
profitability (return on assets) constant. We control for year trends and industry fixed effects by implementing dummies in our 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression. These are not reported. We list heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors underneath 
the related coefficient. Standard-errors are clustered at the firm level. Both firm characteristics and investment measures are 
Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. The results are denoted at 
statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year 
observations. 
 
 
 
Industry, Industry,
Size, ln Age, Size, ln Age,
Sample: 2001-2007 2008-2013
Gross + Net +
Dependent Variable:     Gross Gross Intangible Net Intangible Gross Gross
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Public -0.029 *** -0.054 *** -0.045 ** -0.034 ** -0.025 * -0.032 -0.051 ***
0.005 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.015
Inv. Opps. 0.004 *** 0.014 *** 0.018 *** 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.013 0.016 ***
0.000 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.004
ROA -0.043 *** 0.005 0.015 0.024 0.032 -0.072 0.045
0.002 0.025 0.037 0.021 0.033 0.078 0.033
R
2
1.2% 9.7% 11.2% 8.7% 10.4% 9.4% 15.2%
R
2 
adj. 1.2% 8.1% 9.7% 7.0% 8.8% 6.4% 13.1%
No. Obs 314 284 1 258 1 258 1 258 1 258 508    628    
No firms 62 750   527    527    527    527    275    337    
Industry, Size, ln Age   Full
57 
 
Table 7 Panel A. Unconditional Investment Levels – Detailed Sample 
Panel A reports the results from estimating equation (2) in Section 3.1.2. The samples is identical with those we present in Table 3. In column (1) to (4), we match on industry, size, leverage, cash 
holding, cost of debt and ROA. In column (6) to (9) we include asset ratio and RE/TA to control for within industry differences in capital intensity and lifecycle differences, respectively. The 
public coefficient show the difference between public and private firms investment levels, holding investment opportunities (sales growth) and profitability (return on assets) constant. We control 
for year trends and industry fixed effects by implementing dummies in our ordinary least square (OLS) regression. These are not reported. We list heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
underneath the related coefficient. Standard-errors are clustered at the firm level. Both firm characteristics and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the 
impact of spurious outliers on our results. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year 
observations. Panel B show the estimated coefficients of public investment levels across our different samples.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample:
Gross +  Net + Gross + Net +
Dependent Variable:    Gross Intangibles  Net  Intangibles Gross Intangibles Net Intangibles
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public -0.057 *** -0.063 *** -0.038 ** -0.043 ** -0.058 *** -0.056 *** -0.040 ** -0.038 **
0.014 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.014
Inv. Opps. 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.012 ** 0.015 *** 0.017 *** 0.019 *** 0.015 *** 0.018 ***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
ROA 0.050 0.070 0.045 0.064 -0.042 -0.056 0.003 -0.010
0.050 0.063 0.046 0.058 0.047 0.060 0.043 0.054
R
2
12.0% 13.7% 10.4% 12.4% 17.9% 19.4% 15.8% 17.3%
R
2 
adj. 9.8% 11.6% 8.2% 10.3% 15.1% 16.7% 12.9% 14.5%
No. Obs 961 961   961   961   647   647   647   647   
No firms 444 444   444   444   291   291   291   291   
Panel B:
Sample
     Public -0.057 *** -0.063 * -0.038 ** -0.043 ** -0.058 *** -0.056 *** -0.040 ** -0.038 **
Sample
     Public -0.054 *** -0.045 ** -0.034 ** -0.025 * -0.057 *** -0.063 * -0.038 ** -0.043 **
Difference -0.003 -0.018 -0.003 -0.019 0.000 0.008 -0.003 0.005
Industry, size, ln age Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt, ROA
Matched on:
Industry, Size, Leverage
Cash Holdings, Cost of Debt, ROA
Industry, Size, Leverage, Cash Holdings,
Cost of Debt, ROA, RE/TA, Asset Ratio
Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt, ROA Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt, ROA, RE/TA, asset ratio
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Table 8. Conditional Investment Levels – Year Loop 
This table reports the investment levels of matched public and private firms, based on our exact year loop matching and propensity score matching. We describe the matching procedure in Section 
3.1.3.1.We only keep years that satisfies the propensity score balancing assumptions, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. For a further description 
of this assumption, see Section 2.4.1. We list all dropped years in Table 19, Panel A. In row 2 and 3, we match on year, asset ratio and size, while row 4 and 5 include firm age to control for 
lifecycle differences. A detailed description of all variables are reported in the variable definition and construction in the Appendix. Both firm characteristics (except age) and investment measures 
are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. We use paired t-tests to assess differences in investment levels between matched public and 
private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
  
R
o
w Sample
Investment
Measure Mean Std. Dev
No. of 
Obs.
No. of
 Firms Mean Std. dev
No. of 
Obs.
No. of
 Firms
1 Full sample: Gross 0.041 0.474 1 956          311 0.064 3.113 520 112      87 443        -0.023
Sample matched on:
2 Gross 0.027 0.109 777             230 0.069 0.233 777             608 -0.042 ***
3 Gross + intangibles 0.040 0.162 777             230 0.078 0.260 777             608 -0.039 ***
4 Net 0.006 0.094 777             230 0.037 0.221 777             608 -0.031 ***
5 Net + intangibles 0.019 0.155 777             230 0.047 0.249 777             608 -0.028 ***
6 Gross 0.036 0.136 288             164 0.087 0.235 288             240 -0.051 ***
7 Gross + intangibles 0.039 0.172 288             164 0.089 0.264 288             240 -0.050 ***
8 Net 0.014 0.117 288             164 0.048 0.222 288             240 -0.034 **
9 Net + intangibles 0.019 0.167 288             164 0.052 0.255 288             240 -0.032 *
Year, asset ratio, size, ln age
Public Firms Private Firms Public - Private Firms
Difference in
 Means
Year, asset ratio, size
59 
 
Table 9. Conditional Investment Levels – No loop 
This table reports the investment levels of matched public and private firms, based propensity score matching without any exact loop matching. We describe the matching procedure in Section 
3.1.3.2.The propensity score balancing assumptions is fulfilled, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. For a further description of this assumption, 
see Section 2.4.1. In row 2 through 5, we match on year, asset ratio, size and age. In row 6 to 9 we match on year, asset ratio, size, ROA, leverage, cash holdings and sales growth. Size is set to 
2013 purchasing power, to control for across year comparisons A detailed description of all variables are reported in the variable definition and construction in the Appendix. Both firm 
characteristics (except age) and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. We use paired t-tests to assess 
differences in investment levels between matched public and private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. 
All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
R
o
w Sample
Investment
Measure Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms Mean Std. Dev
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms
1 Full sample: Gross 0.041 0.474 1 956         311 0.064 3.113 520 112     87 443       -0.023
Sample matched on:
2 Gross 0.041 0.189 1 255         252 0.083 0.248 1 255         906 -0.042 ***
3 Gross + intangibles 0.060 0.261 1 255         252 0.089 0.266 1 255         906 -0.029 ***
4 Net 0.012 0.171 1 255         252 0.031 0.203 1 255         906 -0.018 ***
5 Net + intangibles 0.013 0.175 1 255         252 0.049 0.239 1 255         906 -0.036 **
Sample matched on:
6 Gross 0.034 0.201 524            174 0.073 0.221 524            349 -0.038 ***
7 Gross + intangibles 0.044 0.245 524            174 0.087 0.258 524            349 -0.043 ***
8 Net 0.012 0.189 524            174 0.037 0.209 524            349 -0.025 **
9 Net + intangibles 0.022 0.234 524            174 0.051 0.246 524            349 -0.029 **
Year, asset ratio, size, ROA, leverage, cash holdings, sales growth
Public Firms Private Firms Public - Private Firms
Difference in
 Means
Year, asset ratio, size, ln age
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Table 10. Sensitivity to Investment Opportunities 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (3) shown in Section 3.2. The estimated coefficient investment 
opportunities show private firms sensitivity to investment opportunities, while investment opportunities + public show public 
firms sensitivity to investment opportunities. The sample is identical with the one we present in Table 2, matching on industry 
and size. We examine public and private firms investment sensitivities by exploiting within-firm variation. We have two 
measures of investment opportunities, sales growth and approximate Q (See Section 2.3). The depended variable is gross 
investment. We include year dummies to control for year trends. These are not reported. We also include firm fixed effects, by 
using the fixed effects module in Stata. We list heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors underneath the related coefficient. 
Standard-errors are clustered at the firm level. Both firm characteristics and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th 
and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. The results are denoted at statistical significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. The t-
test is two-sided, while the F-test is one-sided.   
 
Dependent Variable: 
Measure of Investment Opps.: Appr. Q
   Industry, Industry, Matched All public Industry, 
Sample:    Size Size Public Firms Firms Size
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Investment opportunities 0.017 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.0002
0.018 0.003 0.003 0.0004
x public -0.006 -0.0002
0.018 0.0004
Inv. Opps (2001-2007) 0.008   
0.013
x public 0.001   
0.013
Inv. Opps (2008-2013) 0.152   
0.088
x public -0.011
0.122
ROA 0.062 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.037
0.102 0.118 0.031 0.031 0.063
ROA x public -0.066 -0.177 -0.037
0.106 0.079 0.067
R
2 
(within)
No. obs 2 280      2 280   1 313   1 314   3 435      
No firms 1 044      1 044   252      252      1 521      
F-test: all coeff. = 0 2.09        *** 2.15     *** 2.46     *** 2.47     *** 1.21        
Gross Investment
Sales Growth
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Table 11. Sensitivity to Investment Opportunities – Detailed 
As Table 10, this table presents the results from estimating equation (3) shown in Section 3.2. The estimated coefficient 
investment opportunities show private firms sensitivity to investment opportunities, while investment opportunities + public 
show public firms sensitivity to investment opportunities. The sample is identical with the one we present in Table 3, matching 
on industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt and ROA. We examine public and private firms investment sensitivities, 
by exploiting within-firm variation. We have two measures of investment opportunities, sales growth and approximate Q (See 
Section 2.3). The depended variable is gross investment. We include year dummies to control for year trends. These are not 
reported. We also include firm fixed effects, by using the fixed effects module in Stata. We list heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors underneath the related coefficient. Standard-errors are clustered at the firm level. Both firm characteristics and 
investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. 
The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All 
observations are firm-year observations. The t-test is two-sided, while the F-test is one-sided.   
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Measure of Investment Opps: Appr. Q
Sample:
(4)
Investment opportunities 0.044 *** 0.015 *** 0.011 *** -0.001
0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002
x public -0.030 *** 0.001
0.005 0.001
Inv. Opps (2001-2007) 0.044   ***
0.001   
x public -0.030 ***
0.005   
Inv. Opps (2008-2013) 0.044   
0.039   
x public -0.029
0.040   
ROA -0.067 -0.067 0.065 0.002 0.090
0.066     0.067   0.143   0.031        0.108        
ROA x public 0.120     0.123 -0.106
0.150     0.149   0.140        
R
2 
(within) 17.60 % 17.60 % 15.10 % 9.13 % 2.96 %
No. obs 961        961      554      1 314         1 560         
No firms 444        444      167      252            700            
F-test: all coeff. = 0 184.20   *** 301.20 *** 2.43     *** 2.47           *** 1.44           
Gross Investment
Sales Growth
Industry, Size, 
Industry, Size, Leverage, Cash 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Leverage, Cash Holdings, Matched Holdings, Cost of 
Cost of Debt, ROA Public Firms Debt, ROA
All public 
Firms
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Table 12. Lifecycle Differences, Sampling and Macroeconomic Effects 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (3) shown in Section 3.2, when we control for lifecycle differences. The estimated coefficient investment opportunities show private firms 
sensitivity to investment opportunities, while investment opportunities + public show public firms sensitivity to investment opportunities. Column (1) and (2) contain our industry and size matched 
sample, controlling for lifecycle differences by RE/TA and age, respectively. In column (3) and (4), we do exact industry loop matching and propensity score matching. Size is set to 2013 
purchasing power, to control for between year comparisons. In column (5) and (6), we do exact year loop matching and propensity score matching. We examine public and private firms investment 
sensitivities by exploiting within-firm variation. We have two measures of investment opportunities, sales growth and approximate Q (See Section 2.3). The depended variable is gross investment. 
We include year dummies to control for year trends. These are not reported. We also include firm fixed effects, by using the fixed effects module in Stata. We list heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors underneath the related coefficient. Standard-errors are clustered at the firm level. Both firm characteristics (except age) and investment measures are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th 
percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All 
observations are firm-year observations. The t-test is two-sided, while the F-test is one-sided.   
 
Sample:
Dependent Variable:
Investment opportunities 0.006 0.029 ** 0.052 *** 0.054 *** 0.063 *** 0.067 ***
0.006 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.011
… x public 0.009 -0.017 -0.037 *** -0.037 *** -0.056 *** -0.054 ***
0.007 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.012
ROA -0.030 -0.193 -0.069 -0.048 -0.347 ** -0.166
0.372 0.181 0.363 0.384 0.131 0.159
… x public 0.091 0.289 0.007 -0.031 0.458 ** 0.308
0.379 0.188 0.370 0.391 0.151 0.176
R
2 
(within) 11.7% 13.9% 34.1% 34.2% 21.1% 21.1%
No. Obs 1 083         1 258         647    647    933            933   
No firms 483            527            291    291    536            536   
F-test: all coeff. =0 2.42           *** 2.31           *** 17.22 *** 12.11 *** 6.75           *** 6.35  ***
Exact Industry Matching: Exact Year Matching:
Size,
Industry,
ln Age
Size,
Industry,
RE/TA
Gross
Gross +
 Intangibles
(1)
Gross
(2)
Gross
(3) (6)
Industry, Size, Leverage, 
Cash Holdings, Assets Ratio, 
ROA, RE/TA, Cost of Debt
Size, ln(Age)
Capital Intensity
Gross +
 Intangibles
(4)
Gross
(5)
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Table 13. Differences in Profitability 
This table reports the differences in profitability of matched public and private firms. Row 2 contains our exact industry loop matching and propensity score size matching. Row 3 include age, 
while row 4 and 5 examines profitability before and after the global financial crisis. See Section 2.4 for a description of our matching procedure. We use return on assets to proxy for profitability. 
All firm characteristics (except age) are Winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile to lessen the impact of spurious outliers on our results. We use paired t-tests to assess differences in profitability 
between matched public and private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-
year observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample
Profit-
ability
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms
Profit-
ability
No.of 
Obs.
No.of
 Firms
1 Full sample: -0.047 1 956         311            0.050 520 112     87 443       -0.097 ***
Sample matched on:
2 -0.047 1 955         311            0.052 1 955         1 299         -0.099 ***
3 -0.036 1 102         212         0.047 1 102         609            -0.083 ***
4 0.003 380            104            0.046 380            252            -0.043 ***
5 -0.086 689            161         0.039 689            492            -0.125 ***
Measure for Profitability: Return on Assets (ROA)
R
o
w
Public Firms Private Firms Public - Private Firms
Diff. in
Profitability
Industry, size
Industry, size, ln age
Industry, size, ln age (2001-2007)
Industry, size, ln age (2008-2013)
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Table 14. Summary Statistics - Winsorizing Robustness 
As in Table 1, this table presents summary statistics of matched public and private firms, by using exact industry loop matching 
and propensity score size matching. Size is set to 2013 purchasing power, to control for across-year comparisons. However, all 
variables (except age and approximate Q) are now Winsorized at the 0.1st and 99.9th percentile. The results from our findings 
in Table 1 are listed in the right column. Test statistics of mean differences in firm size, investment opportunities and firm 
characteristics are obtained by using t-test. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given 
superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. 
 
 
 
 
Winsorizing Level:
Firm Size Public Private
Total assets 2 469 967       2 426 662       43 305       *** -8 275        ***
std. dev. 3 867 514       3 702 109       
Investment Opportunities
Sales growth 1.896              1.188              0.708         0.581         ***
std. dev. 16.076            18.001            
Approximate Q 25.465            27.341            -1.876        *** -1.372        ***
std. dev. 23.838            27.457            
Firm Characteristics
ROA -0.072             0.047              -0.118        *** -0.099        ***
std. dev. 0.372              0.153              
Asset ratio 0.241              0.602              -0.361        *** -0.345        ***
std. dev. 0.465              1.018              
Leverage 0.450              0.581              -0.131        *** -0.147        ***
std. dev. 0.337              0.294              
RE/TA -0.092             0.022              -0.114        *** -0.106        ***
std. dev. 0.365              0.161              
Cost of debt 0.146              0.147              -0.000        0.033         ***
std. dev. 1.030              1.218              
Cash holdings 0.131              0.080              0.051         *** 0.056         ***
std. dev. 0.189              0.145              
Age 28.090            20.364            7.726         *** 9.436         ***
std. dev. 32.637            24.035            
ROE -0.107             0.150              -0.257        *** -0.374        ***
std. dev. 1.431              2.410              
No. of observations* 1 956              520 112          1 955         
No of firms* 311                87 443           
Matched Sample
Difference Difference
* Sales growth, cost of debt and ROE contains less observations due to missing values.
99.8% 99.0%
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Table 15. Conditional Investment Level – Winsorizing Robustness 
As in Table 2, 3 and 4, this table reports the differences in investment levels between public and private firms, but with all variables (except age) Winsorized at the 0.1st and 99.9th percentile. The 
result from Table 2, 3 and 4 (based on old Windsorizing level) are listed in the two right columns. We only keep industries consistent with the propensity score balancing assumption, with 
standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. All dropped industries are reported in Table 18, Panel B. We use paired t-tests to assess differences in investment 
levels between matched public and private firms. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are 
firm-year observations. For further details, see descriptions in Table 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Investment Measure Means
No. of 
Obs. Means
No. of 
Obs.
Total no.
of Obs.
Total no.
of Obs.
Sample Matched on:
1 Gross 0.031 1947 0.120 1947 -0.088 *** 3894 -0.057 *** 3910
2 Gross + intangible 0.047 1947 0.139 1947 -0.092 *** 3894 -0.063 *** 3910
3 Net 0.009 1947 0.087 1947 -0.078 *** 3894 -0.043 *** 3910
4 Net + intangible 0.026 1947 0.108 1947 -0.082 *** 3894 -0.048 *** 3910
Sample Matched on:
5 Gross 0.025 484 0.134 484 -0.109 *** 968 -0.067 *** 2204
6 Gross + intangible 0.039 484 0.156 484 -0.116 *** 968 -0.066 *** 2204
7 Net 0.005 484 0.093 484 -0.087 *** 968 -0.056 *** 2204
8 Net + intangible 0.020 484 0.115 484 -0.095 *** 968 -0.055 *** 2204
Sample Matched on:
9 Gross 0.035 109 0.262 109 -0.227 ** 218 -0.039 *** 1658
Sample Matched on:
10 Gross -0.018 91 0.136 51 -0.154 * 142 -0.019 876
Difference 
in Means
Difference 
in Means
Private FirmsPublic Firms Public Firms - Private Firms
R
o
w
Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, cost of debt and ROA
Industry, size and ln age
Industry and size
Industry, size, leverage, cash holdings, sales growth, ROA
Public Firms - Private Firms
99.8 % 99.0 %
Winsorizing level
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Table 16. Unconditional Investment Levels – Winsorizing Robustness 
As in Table 5 and 6, this table reports the differences in investment levels between public and private firms, but with all 
variables (except age) Winsorized at the 0.1st and 99.9th percentile. We only keep industries consistent with the propensity 
score balancing assumption, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. All dropped 
industries are reported in Table 18, Panel B. The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given 
superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All observations are firm-year observations. For further details, see table descriptions 
in Table 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Sample:
Dependent Variable: Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public -0.059 *** -0.040 ** -0.121 *** -0.088 ** -0.111 *** -0.063 **
0.013 0.013 0.035 0.033 0.025 0.023
Inv. Opps. 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ROA -0.012 0.011 -0.058 -0.030 -0.137 -0.128
0.018 0.016 0.043 0.033 0.155 0.155
R
2
3.0 % 2.3 % 9.8 % 9.0 % 86.3 % 85.9 %
R
2 
adj. 2.0 % 1.3 % 7.0 % 6.2 % 84.5 % 84.0 %
No. Obs 2 406 2 406         602   602        142        142        
No firms 1 114 1 114         276   276        80          80          
Winsorizing Level: 99.8%
Industry, Size, Leverage, Cash 
Holdings,  Cost of Debt, ROAIndustry, size Industry, Size, ln Age
67 
 
Table 17. Sensitivity to Investment Opportunities – Winsorizing Robustness 
As Table 10, 11 and 12, this table reports the sensitivity to investment opportunities between public and comparable private 
firms, but with all variables variables (except age) Winsorized at the 0.1st and 99.9th percentile. We drop all industries and years 
not consistent with the propensity score balancing assumption, with standardized difference of less than 25% and variation 
ratio between 0.5 and 2. All dropped industries and years are reported in Table 18 Panel B and Table 19 Panel B, respectively. 
The results are denoted at statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, given superscript ***, ** and *, respectively. All 
observations are firm-year observations. For further details, see descriptions in Table 10, 11 and 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:
Measure on investment opps:
Industry,
Sample: size, age
Investment opportunities 0.046 0.169 0.069 ** 0.036
0.044 0.143 0.021 0.038
x public -0.044 -0.159 -0.063 ** -0.034
0.044 0.143 0.021 0.038
Inv. Opps (2001-2007) 0.030 0.227
0.041 0.331
x public -0.029 -0.222
0.041 0.331
Inv. Opps (2008-2013) 0.173 ** 0.209
0.059 0.186
x public -0.170 ** -0.195
0.059 0.185
ROA 0.063 0.032 0.517 0.432 -0.433 0.227
0.074 0.076 0.284 0.446 0.259 0.199
ROA x public -0.014 0.016 -0.522 -0.470 0.498 -0.242
0.079 0.080 0.371 0.467 0.263 0.207
R
2 
(within) 4.1 % 4.9 % 51.1 % 58.3 % 10.3 % 8.2 %
No. obs 2406 2406 142 142 602 507
No firms 1 114  1 114  80       80               276           340           
F-test: all coeff. = 0 1.345  1.784  ** 5.109  *** 10 073        *** 2 995        *** 1 357        
Sales Growth
 Gross Investment
Control for Lifecycle Stages
Size, capital
intensity, age
Industry, size, leverage, cash
holdings, cost of debt, ROA
Industry Loop Year Loop
Industry,
size
(6)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
68 
 
Table 18. Excluded Industries 
This table presents all manually dropped industries that do not satisfy the propensity score balancing assumption, with 
standardized difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. Panel A and Panel B show the dropped industries 
for Winsorizing levels of 99% and 99.8%, respectively. We present the different industries in Panel C.  
 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
 
Panel C 
 
 
Dropped Industry = 1
Industry Loop Winsorizing level 99%
PSM Characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Size, ln age 1 1 1 1
Size, ln age (2001-2007) 1 1 1 1
Size, ln age (2008-2013) 1 1 1 1
Size, RE/TA 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
Total dropped in each industry = 5 0 2 5 5 2 7 3 4
Industry
Size, leverage, cash holding
Sales growth, ROA
Size, leverage, cash 
holdings, cost of debt, ROA
Size, asset ratio, leverage
cash holdings, RE/TA, ROA
Size, asset ratio, leverage cash 
holdings, RE/TA, ROA,  Cost of debt
Industry Loop Winsorizing level 99.8%
PSM Characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Size, ln age 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total dropped in each industry = 1 2 1 3 3 1 3 3 1
Industry
Size, leverage, cash holding
Sales growth, ROA
Size, leverage, cash 
holdings, cost of debt, ROA
Industry Description 
1 Primary Industry
2 General Industry
3 Oil and Gas
4 Constructing and Energy
5 Trade
6 Shipping
7 Transport and Tourism 
8 Consulting and Real Estate
9 IT and Communications 
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Table 19. Dropped Years  
This table presents all manually dropped years that do not satisfy the propensity score balancing assumption, with standardized 
difference of less than 25% and variation ratio between 0.5 and 2. Panel A and Panel B show the dropped years for Winsorizing 
levels of 99% and 99.8%, respectively.   
 
Panel A 
Dropped Year = 1 Winsorizing level 99% 
Year Loop                           
PSM Characteristics Year 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
                              
Size, capital intensity   1 1 1   1   1             
                              
Size, capital intensity,                              
ln age       1     1   1 1 1       
                              
Total dropped in each year = 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Panel B 
Dropped Year = 1   Winsorizing level 99.8% 
Year Loop                             
PSM Characteristics Year 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
                              
Size, capital intensity     1 1 1 1 1           1   
                              
Size, capital intensity,                              
ln age   1 1 1   1   1         1 1 
                              
Total dropped in each year = 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 
 
 
 
 
